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Vulnerability is an emerging issue that has been raised repeatedly in sociological analyses at the dawn of 
the twenty-first century and in debates on public policies aimed at alleviating poverty, promoting upward 
social mobility and empowering citizens. If this issue has been so topical, it is because a variety of factors, 
some highly controversial and others difficult to measure accurately, have contributed to the phenomenon. 
They include: the increasingly unstable macroeconomic context; the frequency with which households 
lapse into and emerge from poverty, a trend seen even among traditionally secure groups; various signs of 
fragmentation and social asymmetries; defencelessness against different types of risk, some of which have 
been growing; and new forms of segmentation of access to important assets in terms of social mobility. 
 
Conscious of this situation, national delegations attending the meeting of the ECLAC sessional Ad 
Hoc Committee on Population and Development held during the twenty-ninth session of the Commission 
(Mexico, D.F., April 2000) requested the Population Division of ECLAC-Latin American and Caribbean 
Demographic Centre (CELADE) to prepare a document on social vulnerability. In response to this 
mandate, which was embodied in resolution 577(XXVIII) of the Commission, a summary version1 of the 
document, “Socio-demographic vulnerability: old and new risks for communities, households and 
individuals”,2 was prepared thanks to the valuable support of other ECLAC divisions and the technical 
and financial cooperation provided by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and was presented 
and considered at the following ECLAC session (Brasilia, May 2002). 
 
The text now being presented in electronic format consists of two chapters of the document. The 
first reviews the literature on the subject and describes in detail the approach and notion of vulnerability, 
which are considered relevant for the analysis of relationships between population and development at the 
level of households, communities and individuals. The second presents the conclusions formulated with a 
view to proposing policy options for addressing the problem of socio-demographic vulnerability and for 
obtaining a deeper insight into the relationship between population and development. 
 
This material is being published electronically in response to an explicit request from countries 
represented on the ECLAC sessional Ad Hoc Committee on Population and Development and to a need 
identified in recent months, when technical assistance on socio-demographic vulnerability was being 
provided to countries in the region. The issue has aroused tremendous interest and high expectations, but is 
also the subject of doubts and skepticism. Hence, both the first chapter, which examines and elucidates the 
conceptual approach and the conclusions seek to give a clear picture of the scope, potential and limitations 
of the study of socio-demographic vulnerability in the region. The application of a notion of vulnerability 
that incorporates in a logical chain socio-demographic risks and the ability to respond and adapt is 
extremely useful, especially for considering emerging issues relating to population and development from 
the point of view of the individual, the household and the community and for the adoption of appropriate 
measures in this regard. This does not mean that the notion of socio-demographic vulnerability is cut and 
dried or can be interpreted in a single way or that the approach used in this case is superior to earlier 
approaches. This study is, rather, a contribution to the difficult and invariably complex task of 
understanding and predicting the demographic dynamic and of acting intelligently in this respect in order to 
promote recognition of individual rights, improve living conditions of households and further the economic 
and social development of communities. 
                                                 
1 LC/G.2170(Ses.29/16). 
2 LC/R.2086. 
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I. SOCIAL AND SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC VULNERABILITY: 
CONCEPTUAL, THEORETIC AND EMPIRICAL APPROACHES 
 
 
A. THE NOTION OF VULNERABILITY, ITS COMPONENTS  
AND USES IN DIFFERENT DISCIPLINES 
 
 
In common usage, the term “vulnerability” denotes risk, fragility, defencelessness or harm and is applied to 
that which “may be wounded or harmed” (The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English). Studies of 
social vulnerability go beyond these definitions, however valid they may be, to examine the possibility of 
controlling the effects of materialization of such risk, since social vulnerability implies both exposure to a 
risk1 and the extent to which each unit of reference2 is able to confront it, either through an endogenous 
response or through support from external sources (http://www.wfp.it/vam_documents/ 
a/va99/html/vamover.htm; Chambers 1989): 
 
 Vulnerability = exposure to risks + inability to respond [1] 
 
This relationship may be extended to make explicit the possibility of adapting to the risk. The mere 
acceptance of risk is a passive form of adaptation and equates to resignation, which stems from fatalism; 
on the other hand, an active adaptation is a particular form of response, which, being more sustainable 
over time, implies internal (sometimes, thorough-going) restructuring by the units of reference. In order to 
include this specification, a distinction should be made, with respect to the inability to respond, between an 
inability to face risk and an inability to adapt actively to its consequences, elements which correspond to 
what Moser (1998, p. 3) calls sensitivity and resilience, respectively: 
 
 Vulnerability = exposure to risks + inability to confront them [2] 
+ inability to adapt in an active way 
 
Understood in this way, the notion of vulnerability can be applied to various social processes; in 
order to make the most of this potential, it is necessary to specify its conceptual scope and explore its 
advantages as an analytic approach. Thus, this document seeks, first and foremost, to elucidate the 
                                                 
1 The importance of the concept of risk for the notion of vulnerability calls for an explanation. In this 
document, this term refers to the possibility that some eventuality (the occurrence or presence of an event, 
characteristic or process) may entail adverse effects for the unit of reference (community, home, person, business, 
ecosystem or other). That is, a risk does not refer to an intrinsically negative event, but rather to one that can 
generate harm or uncertainty and whose concrete consequences may be ambiguous or mixed, combining adversity or 
opportunity, although the latter will only be mentioned in passing in this document. The recognition that some risks 
imply opportunities is the basis for the expression “positive risks”(Ocampo, 2001b, p. 16), in the sense that 
Schumpeter adscribes to “creative destruction” (for a recent summary of the debate on the concept of risk, see the 
virtual conference on the theory and practice of social sciences in catastrophic risk situations, 
www.proteccioncivil.org/ceise/ceisevirtual). 
2 The expression unit of reference —or failing this, the term actor (although a collective action is not always 
involved)— is used to refer to different, potentially vulnerable social entities: communities, households and persons. 
Communities are groups of individuals established in a well-defined territory (national, subnational or, even, urban), 
or who share a common culture.  
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specific contents of the concept of social vulnerability and, in particular that of socio-demographic 
vulnerability, without ignoring the links between the two. Next, on the basis of the system which links 
exposure to risks with the inability to confront them and the inability to adapt actively to their 
consequences, it considers the effectiveness of an approach for analysing vulnerability in the context of 
the  relationships between population and development. 
 
The notion of vulnerability is present in a wide range of disciplines, in some of which its application 
is fairly direct. This is true in the case of epidemiology, particularly if the risks are limited to the exposure 
to pathogens. However, vulnerability to any disease is not defined exclusively by contact with vectors; it 
also depends on the immunological system of the individual concerned, whether in its natural state or 
reinforced by vaccination. If the disease develops, the damage it causes can be controlled, at least in part, 
by external help, which will reduce or possibly eliminate its adverse effects. Lastly, endogenous mutations 
of different kinds can enable the body to adapt to pathogens and after a variable lapse of time, to sustain a 
harmless relationship with them. 
 
In social spheres, the precise delimitation of vulnerability is more complex, even if, in some 
disciplines, the risks can be described in a relatively standard way, provided that the dimension that they 
affect is clearly identified. This is what seems to occur with the studies on food security, in which the 
dimension likely to be affected is the calorie intake (Watts and Bohle, 1993); in this case, vulnerability is 
defined as the probability of a sharp reduction in access to food or of a fall in consumption levels below the 
minimum rate necessary for survival (http://www.wfp.it/vam_documents/va/va99/html/vamover.htm) and 
may be expressed in a relatively simple equation, in which this probability depends on the occurrence of 
risks (such as droughts, floods, conflicts or price fluctuations) that cut the supply and availability of foods. 
The greatest conceptual difficulty in these studies stems from specifying and implementing the ability to 
respond and the adaptive skills of the actors. 
 
In legal terms, vulnerability concerns the non-fulfilment or violation of rights and liberties enshrined 
in national legislation or contained in international agreements that have legal force in different countries. It 
also relates to the inability to counteract this state of affairs by institutional means —which can lead to 
discrimination— and to difficulties in addressing its causes or influencing those responsible or, at least, in 
rectifying its consequences. 
 
In macroeconomics, the content and definition of the notion of vulnerability are drawn from the 
everyday professional work of economists. In general, an economy is vulnerable when it shows a high 
sensitivity to extrinsic shocks associated with a extensive trade liberalization or a heavy reliance on foreign 
capital or foreign investment flows (O’Connel, 2001; Destremau and Salam, 2001). Until recently, the 
impacts experienced by the economies of the developing countries were basically trade-related and were 
linked to fluctuations in the demand and prices for their main exports; at present, financial shocks have 
become the predominant problem (Ocampo, 2001a, p. 28). However, external openness in itself is not a 
sufficient condition for vulnerability as described in equation [2]. This situation will arise when deficiencies 
in forecasting and in building up defences or the extent of asymmetries between developed and developing 
countries in terms of their financial structure and the functioning of the economy (Ocampo, 2001a, p. 28) 
lead to an inability to cope with the damage caused by extrinsic shocks. If the response capacity fails, 
there is still the option of adapting, which means that vulnerability can be moderated or neutralized in the 
medium and long term, if mechanisms for structural change are used to reallocate resources, reorganize 
production and find alternative sources of financing. 
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The above example is instructive since it demonstrates that the boundaries between disciplines 
that affect the meaning of vulnerability are based on convention and usage in the academic world. 
Moreover, vulnerability is not just limited to the harmful effect of external forces, since domestic conditions 
(a reduction in domestic investment or a weak financial system ) can also disrupt economic activity. Non-
exposure to risk (absence of external vulnerability) is not necessarily a desirable condition, since the other 
side of the coin of any macroeconomic risk is the existence of positive opportunities; nevertheless, if 
extrinsic risk were nullified through a closure of the economy to the outside world 
—which would make external fluctuations irrelevant— other contingencies would arise, such as a shut-
down of the production sector, which would have more serious repercussions than volatility in a context of 
openness. This argument regarding the ambivalence of risk may be extended, with due caution, to other 
social processes. 
 
The notion of vulnerability has been widely used in research relating to adolescence. More recent 
studies indicate that the central component of vulnerability —that is the predominant risks among teenage 
boys and girls (dropping out from school, teenage pregnancy or physical agression)— may be interpreted 
in two ways. One of them relates to high-risk conduct (such as alcohol or drug consumption, unprotected 
sexual intercourse or involvement with gangs), while the second refers to “high-risk situations, which 
include those that are genetic, socio-structural or family-related (for example, belonging to an ethnic 
minority, living in poverty or being from a single-parent family) and those of a social type (for example, 
living in violent neighbourhoods). These interpretations give rise to two discourses on the vulnerability of 
adolescents of both sexes, which translate into different policy options: one geared towards individual 
decisions and the other to contexts in which these can develop (Fischhoff, Nightingale and Iannota, 2001); 
both discourses are coherent and convincing, but they are based on different notions of risk. 
 
 
B. SOCIAL VULNERABILITY 
 
 
1. Distinctions and precautions  
 
The notion of social vulnerability applies to socially vulnerable groups, which may be identified on the basis 
of different criteria: the existence of some circumstantial factor that makes them more prone to facing 
adverse situations in terms of their social integration and personal development (groups socially at risk), 
practices that imply a higher exposure to harmful events or the presence of a shared basic attribute (age, 
sex or ethnic origin) which leads to common risks or problems. The identification of vulnerable groups has 
unobjectionable merits and is often used in public policies, preferably in cross-sectoral policies (such as 
those relating to generational or gender issues); however, it leaves open the possibility of distinguishing as 
many vulnerable groups as there are risks and their wide internal heterogeneity becomes an obstacle to the 
effective action of policies. The notion of social vulnerability, while it may lead to a classification of groups, 
precedes this kind of identification exercise, since it requires specification of risks and a determination both 
of the ability to respond of the units of reference and of their capacity for active adaptation. 
 
One initial observation that warrants the examination of social vulnerability is that risks, defence 
capacity and adaptation skills vary significantly in type and complexity, as a result of which it is often 
difficult to distinguish between these components. The institutional fragility and lack of socio-economic 
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equity are usually considered to be risks as they hinder socio-economic development and undermine social 
cohesion; nevertheless, in a specific situation —such as a harmful environmental event— they become 
factors that weaken the community’s (or certain sectors’) capacity to respond. 
A second note of caution concerns the fact that social risks can be ambiguous, not only because 
of the potential nature of the adversities that they imply, but also because any challenge creates options. 
Unlike the field of biology, where harmful events do not have obvious positive tradeoffs, in the social 
sphere, a number of risks entail possible opportunities, which obstruct the work of evaluation carried out by 
analysts and policy-makers.3 
 
A third caution concerns the measurement of social vulnerability, which can be quantified or 
qualified through various indicators. Although there is abundant literature on this subject and there are 
numerous experiences to which it applies, there is no universal procedure or indicator of social 
vulnerability. This is due, largely, to the polysemic nature of the notion of vulnerability since one may be 
vulnerable to one or more risks. Thus, elucidating the contents of the notion of vulnerability means defining 
the risks, understanding their mechanisms, identifying their harmful aspects and recognizing the possible 
defences and responses as well as the appropriate and feasible ways of adapting. In short, this explanation 
implies defining the notion and setting limits on its holistic claims. Measuring social vulnerability also proves 
to be complicated since it is specific to each unit of reference; thus, it would be unrealistic to attempt to 
quantify it by adding the vulnerability of subunits.4 
 
 
2. Persistent and emerging social risks 
 
Modern society is characterized by numerous and increasing signs of insecurity, uncertainty and lack of 
protection which manifest themselves in macro- and micro-economic contexts as well as in environmental, 
social and cultural spheres (Ramos, 2000). Such risks are closely related to some central characteristics of 
contemporary society, such as globalization, the complexity inherent in institutional differentiation, the 
technological revolution and the application of reflexivity5 in all fields of human life (UNDP, 1998), 
characteristics that Ulrich Beck (1998) summarized in his widely-read book, Risk Society. Towards a 
New Modernity, first published in the early 1990s. One of the basic factors of uncertainty is the erosion of 
the structuring function formerly fulfilled by the working world; according to Sennet (2000), the dogma of 
                                                 
3 Globalization with the abundant challenges and options that it implies is a paradigm of the ambiguous state 
of social events that can be considered to be risks. This example provides another contribution for the discussion: 
the balance of adversities and potentialities is not the only factor that counts when deciding if one should promote or 
discourage a given event, since one key aspect is to determine the extent to which they are avoidable; in the case of 
unavoidable risks, active strategies for adapting play a central role. 
4 By contrast with the measurement of poverty, the level of which for a group corresponds to the proportion 
of poor (households or persons) existing in that group, the vulnerability of a community depends on the risks to 
which it is exposed as a group and the ability to respond and adapt as a community. 
5 The origin of the concept of reflexivity is to be found in Giddens. His institutional variant (or reflexivity of 
modernity”) implies “the routine incorporation of new knowledge or new information into environments of action that 
are thereby reconstituted or reorganised” (Giddens, 1997b, p. 295). The individual variant of reflexivity has to do with 
the organization of the outside world on the basis of internal criteria; this means, for example, that identity and life 
path are ordered on the basis of a project and personal decisions, filtered and limited, to some extent, by the 
economic, social and symbolic structure (Giddens, 1997b, p. 14).  
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flexibility introduced in career paths by “new capitalism”6 attacks the principles of permanence, trust in 
others, integrity and commitment, which formerly made routine work an organizing element in the lives of 
individuals and, consequently, in their integration within the community. These affirmations contrast with 
the broad evidence that human beings, thanks to the progress of science and technology, now have a vast 
and growing control over their own performance and environment, which makes it possible to eliminate 
various risks or, at least, to mitigate their consequences; this is the case with famines —which now occur 
much less frequently— and of diseases (such as small pox), which have been eradicated. 
 
One of the authors who have recognized this dialectic of progress and risk most keenly is Anthony 
Giddens (1997a, 1997b, 1997c). He considers that the prevailing uncertainty in contemporary society is the 
result of the increased capacity for reflection on all behaviours, both individual and collective. As part of a 
continuous process of reviewing the world, social practices are constantly examined and reformulated in 
the light of new information available; this review destroys earlier certainties, threatens institutions and 
historical protection mechanisms and, above all, introduces a permanent question mark over the future. In 
short, the current risk is “manufactured”, since it depends less and less on natural contingencies and more 
and more on social and cultural interventions, which, in some cases unleash “natural” disasters. The most 
radical expression of “manufactured risk” is the institutionalization of dizzying change as a way of 
production and of life for individuals, households, organizations and communities. In a context in which 
choices have to be made every day —the only choice denied is that of not choosing— the future is highly 
uncertain and, from the outset, all actors appear susceptible to harm, that is to say, vulnerable.7 
 
In the same vein as the Giddens perspective, a multidisciplinary study carried out by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP, Office in Chile) on the paradoxes of modernization recognizes 
the existence of very strong tensions in contemporary modernity. The first tension arises between the 
extension of the ends-means calculation (a distinctive sign of modernization) to the different fields of social 
life  (an inexorable and desirable process, since it generates efficiency and dynamism) and individual 
subjectivity, which draws on elements that are different from, and sometimes, opposed to mere rational 
calculation. The second tension occurs between the subjective expression of social complexification and 
differentiation, which it brings to the development of the self (or reflexive individuality) and its objective 
expression (or systemic specialization), which emancipates the various social fields and removes them 
from the understanding of individuals. A third tension exists between social integration based on shared 
standards and values (or community integration) and integration based on respect for the internal logic of 
the functional subsystems (functional or technical integration). In accordance with this interpretation, 
contemporary risks emerge from the overwhelming resolution of such tensions in favour of modernization 
and macro-social and macroeconomic performance at the expense of subjectivity and individual expression 
(UNDP, 1998, p. 17-18 and 56-76). 
 
Another author who has underscored the importance of contemporary risk, albeit from a 
somewhat different perspective, is Esping-Andersen (2000). He identifies four types of risk: (i) universal 
type risks, such as mortality or physical deterioration in old age; (ii) those that affect specific groups or 
classes of the population, such as emphysema among coal-miners; (iii) life-cycle risks, which are 
expressed in the roles and social conditions typically linked to one’s age; and (iv) intergenerational risks, 
                                                 
6 The reinvention continues, flexible production and non-centralized concentration of power are the cardinal 
components of this “new capitalism” (Sennet, 2000, p. 47-65). 
7 Of course, the risks of today’s society do not only imply harm but also herald new opportunities. 
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which are associated with the transmission of adverse traits by parents to children through genes or 
through socio-cultural mechanisms, as occurs with poverty. Esping-Andersen maintains that the notion of 
risk leads naturally to a social policy based on insurance, which seeks to attenuate the negative 
consequences of risk. This approach, despite its weaknesses, is valid when the probability of being 
affected has a high degree of regularity and is relatively homogeneous throughout the population; however, 
it  loses effectiveness if the risks are unknown, rare, unpredictable or multiple; the last of these are “chain 
risks”, which imply the accumulation of disadvantages, or, to use Sen’s term, a “coupling of 
disadvantages”. As contemporary societies become increasingly complex (internal differentiation), their 
members become more and more heterogeneous and there is a wider range of social risks with a lower 
probability of prediction. The variety and estocastic nature of social risks in modern societies also serve to 
highlight the notion of social vulnerability. 
 
A number of authors (O’Connel, 2001; Rodrik, 2001; IDB, 2000a; ECLAC, 2000b, Pizarro, 2001; 
Kliksberg, 1999; Sojo, 1999; UNDP, 1998; Bustelo and Munujín, 1997) use the notion of social 
vulnerability or persistent and emerging risks to describe the path of economic, social, political and 
ecological development followed by the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in the last 25 years. 
They cite a host of elements, namely: the succession of small (and not so small) economic crises; the 
increasing volatility in GDP and in household consumption; the persistent incidence of poverty; the 
worsening bottlenecks that hinder the generation of good quality jobs and, in general, the deterioration in 
the labour situation, which shows up in high rates of unemployment, lower protection and an increase in 
the various forms of precariousness; the persistent lags in terms of human resource skills and the capacity 
to absorb and generate technological progress, which results in enormous difficulties in sustaining 
competitiveness in virtuous fundamentals; the devastating effect of numerous natural disasters (the El 
Niño current, hurricanes, earthquakes); serious social explosions, which differ from past disturbances in 
terms of the leadership vacuum at the level of organized politics; rising insecurity in day-to-day life, 
reflected in high rates of crime and fear —both objective and subjective—; a disenchantment with politics, 
collective forms of action and traditional organizations for social representation, such as trades unions and 
political parties; the worsening of political conflicts which shrink the bases of legitimacy enjoyed by 
national authorities, who, in the most dramatic cases, can find their term of office brought to a premature 
end, with inevitable repercussions on existing systems of government, since these are now viewed with 
growing mistrust and skepticism. 
 
This brief review of contemporary social risks and their past and emerging manifestations in the 
region points to two conclusions. The first is that the emergence of almost daily risk situations (perhaps 
less crucial but no less important) and of rising uncertainty attests to the relevance of the notion of 
vulnerability and its great heuristic capacity. The second is that whether there are more risks or greater 
vulnerability at present than in the past is immaterial; it makes more sense to identify which risks are 
persistent and which are emerging. 
 
 
3. Response capacity and adaptation skills 
 
In modern society, not only does the risk scenario change but also the ability to respond and the adaptation 
skills of social actors. 
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The response capacity depends on the actors’ assets —especially those they can mobilize to cope 
with the materialization of the risks (see box I.1)— as well as on the external support mechanisms to 
which they have access. The institutionalization of rapid change means that assets soon become out-of-
date thus causing a constant erosion in the response capacity of the units of reference. The “devaluation 
of education” (Franco and Sáinz, 2001) is one example of this trend. Indeed, if education is to be effective 
in social terms, it must respond to the increasing need for updating. In addition, empirical research into 
poverty in the region shows that a significant number of households that are living close to the poverty line 
are exposed to situational changes: “households with incomes between 0.9 and 1.25 poverty lines are 
vulnerable to economic change, even if it is fairly insignificant” (ECLAC, 2000a, p. 44); this highlights the 
weak response capacity of a broad cross-section of people in Latin America and the Caribbean to deal 
with prevailing social risks. This defencelessness reflects, in turn, the weakness of external support 























ASSETS AND SOCIAL VULNERABILITY 
 
In the past, poverty reduction measures tended to focus on income and to overlook the mechanisms, factors, 
characteristics and opportunities that actors have, acquire or receive to strengthen their socio -economic 
integration. Sociologists now recognize the importance of assets and have shifted the focus accordingly 
(Attanasio and Székely, 1999, pp. 320-327; Moser, 1998, pp. 1-5), although the specialist literature does n ot seem 
to provide any agreed definition of this concept. 
According to Kaztman (2000, p. 294), assets refer to the series of material and abstract resources over 
which individuals and households have control and whose mobilization can improve their situation of well-being, 
avoid a deterioration in their living conditions or reduce their vulnerability. While persons and households 
dispose of a variety of resources, only those that make it possible to use the opportunity structures of the State, 
the market and the community are considered to be assets under this approach. In his conceptual development, 
Kaztman (2000, p. 96) expands the notion of assets: “the resources that constitute each asset may be vested: (i) in 
persons, as mental content or physical chara cteristics; (ii) in legislation and customs, as rights over material or 
abstract goods and over access to services; and (iii) in links with persons or institutions”. Similarly, Filgueira 
(2001, pp. 9-10) defines assets as the ownership, control or mobiliza tion of material and symbolic resources, which 
enable the individual to perform in society. Such resources include: financial capital, human capital, work 
experience, level of education, family composition and attributes, social capital, participation in networks and 
physical capital. The author claims that the distinction between the approach based on the concepts of 
vulnerability/assets/opportunity structures and the traditional concept of poverty or unmet basic needs arises 
from the analytical status attributed to assets. Whereas assets used to be identified retrospectively as part of an 
ad hoc examination of the conditions associated with, or which explained, the levels of deprivation, the assets 
approach now examines them on the basis of their internal logic of interdependence and reproduction. While, 
formerly, assets were subordinate to the dependent variable, under the assets approach, the primary focus is the 
logic of independent variables. 
Rather than proposing a definition of assets, Moser (1998, p. 1) categorizes the assets of poor urban 
individuals  
—women, men and children— households and communities in terms of a fivefold “assets vulnerability 
framework”. “These include well-known tangible assets, such as …housing, as well as intangible assets —largely 
invisible— such as household relations and social capital”. Attanasio and Székely (1999, pp. 321-322) indicate that 
the important assets for poor persons are income -generating assets and that the important processes or decisions 
are: (i) the rate of use of their stock of assets; (ii) the market value of the assets; (iii) transfers and legacies. In 
their empirical analysis, these authors classify assets according to three types of capital: human capital, 
represented by the level of education; physical capital, which includes any material or financial wealth; and social 
capital, which consists of the standards and social networks that facilitate collective action. Lastly, Esping-
Andersen (2000, p. 5), in what he terms the “resource approach” and based on a concept of Sen’s (“poverty, 
defined as inability to achieve fulfilment in life and to try to achieve objectives”), suggests that assets are all the 











The market has no welfare mission, but can be used to allocate resources for such purposes; 
while it may provide some defence mechanisms —such as the insurance and credit markets— it is usually 
biased against those actors who are more exposed to higher risks and who have less resources. Even 
though government regulations can reduce these biases, market logic will continue to establish a 
proportional relationship between the cost of protection and the degree of risk exposure. On the other 
hand, one of the fundamental objectives of the State is to protect and support its citizens through public 
policies and programmes; the welfare or provident State, of which the best examples are to be found in the 
Scandinavian countries, is a paradigm for the full realization of this objective. Generally, the State acts on a 
short-term basis providing assistance for coping with economic crises, natural disasters or social 
upheavals, as well as on a long term basis, when its objective is to provide assets to individuals, households 
and communities. In addition, its regulatory function helps to reduce uncertainties and to establish 
insurance (social security) systems based on the principles of solidarity. However, financial weaknesses, 
social asymmetries and political decisions of different kinds usually detract from the efficiency of public 
action directed at a number of risks. Direct public intervention for social protection in Latin America and 
the Caribbean has been undermined by different factors in recent decades, which has led to an increase in 
vulnerability. 
 
Sharing and welfare networks that develop among individuals connected by some common trait 
(ethnic origin, geographic location, social class, religion or nationality) are a traditional source of support 
and protection, but their role has been diminished by the extension of reflexivity to all areas of life, which 
implies the transfer of responsibility for the progress of social actors to each individual’s private sphere. 
For individuals, this implies that self-identity plays an increasingly prominent role; the increase in 
individualistic behaviour, in conjunction with social diversification and complexification, ultimately, 
undermines the pillars of solidarity, collaboration and community support. The reign of individual reflexivity 
also has an impact on the crisis of participatory and social representation organizations (trade unions, 
political parties, trade or professional associations), although the exhaustion of the forces and specific 
historical contexts that have given them support seems to be the main cause of this crisis; thus, structural 
transformations of the labour market have weakened trade unions and the turn of the century ideological 
change undermines the adherence to political parties and even gives rise to disillusionment with politics. 
Hence, the protection that these organizations used to offer in the past dies out, without their being 
replaced by any alternative structure that is able to provide the same security, representation and social 
action. Lastly, the family is the basic entity for protection and socialization of its members; while its 
functions are concentrated primarily in the process of raising children, it gives support and protection to its 
members throughout their lives. Nevertheless, enormous changes have weakened the role of the family, so 
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that it is highly ironic to assume that the family will take on the functions that other support and response 
organizations have ceased to fulfil. 
 
Adaptation is a form of response which, for analytical and practical reasons, should be examined 
separately. In its passive version, it implies acceptance of change as if it were predetermined and as if the 
only solution were to resign oneself or adopt a modus vivendi for living with the prevailing situation, which 
can cause perverse effects. In its active form, it implies internal adjustments for reducing or eliminating 
adversities; if the risk is inevitable, active adaptation will be fundamental for the survival of actors, and if it 
brings opportunities, it will become a strategy for promoting progress. 
 
Communities, households and individuals display a wide variety of skills for adapting to social risks 
but these do not lend themselves to simple classifications, since they usually depend to a great degree on 
each situation. If unemployment becomes an unpredictable and probable risk, active adaptation by the 
individual will call for the deployment of various strategic components: psychological talents for maintaining 
self-esteem in adverse circumstances; ingenuity for coping with new work situations, which implies both 
diversifying contacts and adopting a flexible attitude in order to adjust to the change in paid activity or to 
increase the degree of specialization; bargaining skills so that the person can reach agreements on current 
wages with a view to obtaining employment in the future. Such strategic components are specific but are 
probably not appropriate for adapting, for example, to environmental risks. At the level of communities, 
adaptation develops along evolving paths that are increasingly influenced by the skills of decision-makers in 
forecasting risks and acting accordingly. Since many social risks faced by communities are outside the 
time or existential horizon of households and individuals, decision-makers who seek to promote active 
adaptation will need specialized knowledge in order to design and put into practice forward-looking public 
policies which transcend that horizon and which, therefore, in the short term, may prove incomprehensible 
to individuals and households. 
 
 
4. Empirical research into social vulnerability  
in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
A number of analytic and operational studies conducted in the region refer to the notion of “population 
socially at risk” or vulnerable in different ways to social damage is used. They identify various risk factors 
(poverty, exposure to deviant behaviour patterns, family instability and prolonged unemployment, among 
others), which adversely affect the way society operates and cause emotional damage or trigger anomic 
conduct. When these factors operate in conjunction, they generate a vulnerability which is defined by the 
accumulation of characteristics that predispose the units of reference to show adverse social and psycho-
social results. This approach, used in biomedical studies (which recognize endogenous or environmental 
risks) and for classifying units of reference according to their degree of risk exposure (UNICEF, 1990), 
may be applied to many different purposes, depending on the dimension of the social risk involved, which 
can range from insufficient calorie intake to involvement in criminal activities. Nevertheless, it does not 
adequately address the substantive components of the notion of social vulnerability, especially those 
relating to the determination of the nature of the risk, including the forces that generate and condition them, 
the response capacity and the relevant adaptation skills. 
 
Systematic research into social vulnerability took off in Latin America and the Caribbean during 
the 1990s, as the fruit of reflection on the social effects of the “lost decade”, the subsequent structural 
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adjustment measures and the transformations ushered in by globalization. Initial efforts were directed 
towards working out the reasons for the persistence of poverty despite the policies implemented for 
addressing it and the signs of economic recovery observed in some periods. Two phenomena, of which 
there were empirical signs, influenced the development of this line of work. The first was the apparent 
increasing turnover in poverty affecting the 10%-15% of households which are located around the poverty 
line (ECLAC, 2000a, p. 44; Filgueira, 1998, p. 124), which gave rise to the concept of vulnerability to 
poverty.8 The description of such households has helped to identify some of the factors that lead to this 
form of vulnerability: human capital deficit, precarious or low-intensity employment, a heavy demographic 
burden and cultural exclusion (ECLAC, 2001b and 2000a, 2000b and 2000c). The second issue is the 
repetition of economic crises that immediately have a far-reaching effect on household income and 
consumption levels and which counter the advances towards poverty reduction achieved during economic 
booms. The notion of vulnerability can be applied perfectly well to exposure to external shocks and, as 
such, this concept has been used in the study of economic crises (Ferreira, Prennushi and Ravallion, 1999). 
For this purpose, two assumptions were made: (i) that the poor are the those most hurt by such crises and 
that some members of poor households are more affected than others because of the characteristics of 
these households and their capacity to mobilize assets at opportune times. These studies, which used 
surveys based on repeat visits, discovered a set of characteristics associated with the probability of 
experiencing greater damage during economic crises; some of these characteristics, for example, the high 
number of minors in the home (Glewne and Hall, 1995), are sociodemographic factors. 
 
Another line of work is based on the asset vulnerability framework (Moser, 1998), which is 
centred on the relationship between poverty and the characteristics of the household and its environment. 
While this approach draws on classic texts by Sen, who defines poverty as the absence of skills for 
controlling one’s destiny (Kaztman and others, 1999b, p. 2), it also makes two important contributions: first, 
it recognizes that the poor cope with their precarious situation by drawing on their tangible and intangible 
assets (work, human capital, housing, domestic relationships and social capital)9 and secondly, it highlights 
the role of poor people’s assets and not that of their liabilities, which suggests that appropriate policies for 
rising above poverty and coping with socioeconomic crises should promote use of assets.10 This approach 
was used in a study on poverty in various cities in the world, among them Guayaquil, and the results 
reinforced the idea that the policy should seek to intensify the use of the assets of the poor. In this regard, 
Kaztman and others (1999b, p. 3) state that in an effort to improve the capacity for action of anti-poverty 
programmes, Moser analyses the responses of households and considers the development of multiple 
strategies which individuals and households put into practice to deal with crisis situations, radical economic 
and institutional changes and conditions of vulnerability. 
 
The asset vulnerability framework was also used in a comprehensive study carried out in various 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean on the assets of the poor. The basic idea of this study is that 
                                                 
8 A recent study on Costa Rica defines as vulnerable those households whose income is equivalent to less 
than 1.4 times the poverty line (Proyecto Estado de la Nación en Desarrollo Sostenible, 2001, p. 94). 
9 “In demonstrating the complexity of asset portfolio management in the context of urban economic crisis, 
the study contributes to a growing body of evidence that points to the limitations of income-poverty measurements 
to capture complex external factors affecting the poor as well as their responses to economic difficulty” (Moser, p. 
14). 
10 “Identifying what the poor have, rather than what they do not have focuses on their assets.” “The asset 
framework goes beyond a ‘static’ measuring of the poor toward classifying the capabilities of poor populations to 
use their resources to reduce their vulnerability.” (Moser, pp. 1 and 14). 
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household income is given for the returns obtained from different assets possessed and used productively 
by family members. These include human capital, as well as physical and financial assets and access to 
what is referred to as “social capital” (Attanasio and Székely, 1999, p. 361). Results show that the poor in 
the region have little human capital (measured in terms of years of education), that much fewer poor 
women use this capital to generate income by entering the work force, that little is done among poor 
people to upgrade their human capital and that there is little likelihood of a transfer of assets through 
institutions such as marriage, since couples usually have a similar stock of assets (Attanasio and Székely, 
1999, pp. 335-343). 
 
In terms of policy design, the above-mentioned study draws two important conclusions. The first is 
that efforts to improve the situation of the poor by developing their assets opens up a wide range of options 
for intervention. Some are of a welfare type, for example, direct monetary transfers, which, in addition to 
their impact on the family budget, can have a positive influence on other assets including access to human 
capital; others are more structural in nature and difficult to apply in a market economy, for example, 
increasing the relative price of the assets that the poor have. There are other options which must be 
implemented with caution to avoid possible negative long-term consequences (for example, promoting the 
use of available assets may encourage child labour); lastly, the poor can be encouraged to acquire 
additional assets and to improve their capacity to use them. The second conclusion refers to the need to 
concentrate measures on asset accumulation processes in order to reverse the imbalance in distribution, a 
situation which marks the poor from birth. (Attanasio and Székely, 1999, p. 326). 
 
The notion of vulnerability —as opposed to poverty or even the poverty line— is also used as the 
pivotal point for a comprehensive and complex discourse by a multidisciplinary working group which 
studies the societies of the Southern Cone, where the developmentalist State may be compared to the 
welfare State in the developed countries (Kaztman and Filgueira, 2001; Kaztman, 2000; Filgueira, 2001 
and 1998; Kaztman and others, 1999a and 1999b). This approach is based on an intensive study of three 
elements: the contribution of the asset vulnerability framework, which highlighted the role of assets, albeit 
insufficiently (Kaztman and others, 1999b, pp. 2-5); the change in the development style, including the 
reduction in the protective role of wide State coverage and the negative repercussions that this has had;11 
and the far-reaching changes in other dimensions of social life that cannot be attributed to poverty or dealt 
with by forms of State protection that are now passé.12 On these last two points, Kaztman (2000, p. 277) 
maintains that as the consequences of changes in styles of development became deeper and as new forms 
of precarious participation in the job structure emerged, there was a significant increase in the number of 
households vulnerable to the combined effects of market fluctuations, the decline of the role of the State 
and the weakening of vital institutions (basically, the community and the family)”. 
 
As a corollary of the foregoing, vulnerability remains patent in the fact that broad segments of the 
population are now living in a situation that is in now way conducive to upward social mobility. While it 
may be used as a framework for empirical studies (Kaztman and others, 1999a and 1999b), this approach 
is being constantly revised and the researchers participating in its development are introducing nuances 
                                                 
11 “According to some international organizations, after 20 years of neo-liberal experiments, the countries of 
the Southern Cone and of other parts of the region have acquired an enormous social debt or have neglected 
“development with a human face” (Filgueira, 1998, p. 124). 
12 The instruments and mechanisms generated in the past by the welfare State for protecting members of the 
society from situations of risk and uncertainty are today insufficient and inappropriate. (Filgueira, 1998, p. 135). 
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that added to its complexity. These difficulties notwithstanding, some of its basic characteristics should be 
described: 
 
(i) Far from being restricted to the area of poverty, the notion of vulnerability has a wide field 
of application: in general terms (for purposes of simplification, we will refer only to 
households) a household’s vulnerability varies in inverse proportion to that unit’s capacity 
to control the forces that shape its own destiny or to counteract their effects on well-being 
(Kaztman, 2000, p. 278). 
 
(ii) Social vulnerability refers to deficiencies in assets or to their obsolescence. Unlike the 
concept described in the asset vulnerability framework, assets must be useful for the 
development of strategies for social mobility and not only for rising above poverty or 
coping with economic crises. 
 
(iii) Vulnerability is defined not only in terms of available assets but also in terms of how they 
relate to the socio-economic context, represented by structures of opportunities,13 which 
are probabilities of access to goods, services or activities which affect the well-being of 
the household because they facilitate the use of its existing resources or provide new ones 
which are useful for social mobility and integration through existing channels (Kaztman, 
2000, p. 299). Hence, the conditions of vulnerability depend both on the assets available 
and on the likelihood of access through the State, the market and the community.14 
 
(iv) In addition to those recognized by the asset vulnerability framework (physical, human and 
social capital), assets may also be extended to the sphere of rights (Kaztman, 2000, 
p. 296). 
 
(v) The mere accumulation of assets is insufficient for satisfactory social integration or for 
ensuring the control by units of reference of their own course of development; it is also 
necessary to have a strategy for using these assets in a reasonable way and structural 
opportunities that are favourable to their deployment. This notion of strategy incorporates 
the vision of the actor in the process of acquiring and using assets. 
 
(vi) A distinction can be made, in a way that is still preliminary, between “new and old social 
vulnerabilities”. The “new” forms of vulnerability are associated with: demographic 
changes and changes in the family; transformations in the structure of employment and in 
the way the labour market operates; coexistence between persistent, hard core poverty 
and a “new poverty” that is emerging; weakening of the safety nets provided by the State 
(Filgueira, 1998, pp. 129-136). 
                                                 
13 In fact, this approach is usually referred to as “assets/structures of opportunities” (Kaztman and others, 
1999a). 
14 Other studies state that structures of opportunities contribute to the valorization of assets, since they 
define their returns (Kaztman and Filgueira, 2001, p. 35); it is also claimed that in th eparticular framework of the 
approach put forward here, the notion of vulnerability is centred on the determinants of these situations [the inability 
to control the forces that shape one’s destiny], those that arise because there is a lag or lack of synchronization 
between the requirements for access to structures of opportunities afforded by the market, the State and society and 
assets of households which would enable the latter to take advantage of such opportunities (Kaztman, 2000, p. 278). 
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Other authors, using a perspective similar to the above, but with a clearly different emphasis, state 
that the consolidation of the new pattern of development, based on external openness, the market and a 
subsidiary role for the State, is the fundamental cause of vulnerability as a widespread social phenomenon 
(Pizarro, 2001; ECLAC, 2000a, pp. 49-53): “In the 1980s and 1990s, the number of persons, especially in 
urban areas, who felt they were subject to risk, insecurity and defencelessness increased especially in 
urban areas. This was due to changes in the labour market, the decline in the role of the State, new 
institutional forms for access to social services, the decline in traditional modes of social organization and 
difficulties being experienced by micro and small businesses. “This perception among citizens and the 
actual conditions that underlie it reflect the growing social vulnerability that now encompasses, not only the 
low-income strata but large segments of the middle -income strata as well” (ECLAC, 2000a, p. 49). 
 
The association between vulnerability and lack of social protection in this approach is patent. 
While there has never been a welfare State anywhere in the region that is on par with those of Western 
Europe, some countries —those of the Southern Cone, Mexico and Costa Rica— forged an active 
developmentalist State in terms of social protection; since the 1980s, however, and even earlier in Chile, 
broad segments of the population lost the welfare provided by the State (Gwynne and Kay, 1999, p. 24; 
Filgueira, 1998, pp. 135-136). These groups form the bulk of the middle strata, which historically had 
benefited from government policies for advancement and protection. A recent article on Costa Rica 
describes this situation: “What emerges clearly is the weakening of the middle class, which is more closely 
linked to the State and responsible for the welfare and redistributive policies which are now on the wane. 
Undoubtedly, they seem to be the losers in the new socio-economic and political processes” (Vega, 2000, 
pp. 43-44). Once the State reduces its scope and functions, it targets its social policies towards the poor 
and favours competition over protection, these middle-class groups lose important guarantees and some of 
the justification for their social position becomes weaker: “…in Greater Buenos Aires alone, while 
traditional poverty entrenched in the structurally poor sectors has remained relatively stable in the 1990s, at 
approximately two million, the on-going household surveys of May 1996 shows that there are now over 
four million poor Argentines who come from different segments of the former wider middle class” (López, 
1997, p. 41).15 A recent study of trends in Latin America in the area of occupational stratification 
concludes that “Latin American societies are not on the way to becoming ‘middle -class societies’ —at 
least not as far as employment and income are concerned— … On the contrary, there is every indication 
that the occupational structure has become the foundation for an unyielding and stable polarization of 
income” (ECLAC, 2000a, p. 68). Thus, it is clear that the notion of vulnerability lends itself to the analysis 
of this gradual social decline of the middle classes. 
 
A study on the small-island States of the Caribbean includes a reference to vulnerability in a wider 
sense (ECLAC, 2000b, pp. 247-260) and among the risks identified are: (i) exposure to environmental 
disasters (natural disasters, such as hurricanes, and man-made disasters, such as oil spills) associated with 
their geographic location; (ii) isolation or difficult access, which result in higher transport costs; (iii) a 
limited resource base; (iv) an undiversified production structure and one that is highly sensitive to 
fluctuations in international demand; (v) a weak institutional capacity, in particular with respect to the 
availability of skilled human resources; (vi) high costs of infrastructure and services; (vii) social risks linked 
                                                 
15 In those countries in which the middle class was more developed, its fate is the subject of controversy. 
Thus, among researchers who clearly consider that the situation of the Argentine middle class is critical, some still 
credit it with a favourable outlook for the future, while others declare that it is a lost cause (Ansaldi, 1997, p. 13). 
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to low investment in human capital, high unemployment, social insecurity, delinquency and drugs, 
emigration and socio-economic (income) gaps, and cultural (religious and ethnic) differences, which 
weaken social cohesion. As can be seen, the emphasis is macrosocial in slant and refers to different 
spheres of vulnerability. One important issue is that the accumulation of disadvantages arises at the 
national level, placing severe pressures on public policies. 
 
The notion of vulnerability has been used recently to sketch the situation of international migrants, 
in particular those migrating from poor countries to developed ones. Bustamante (2000, p. 16) indicates 
that there is growing consensus in the international community that the vulnerability of migrants is the 
factor most commonly associated with abuses against human rights. He goes on to state that “vulnerability 
is not a condition that migrants carry with them to the host country, irrespective of the legality of their 
entry, …it is a situation that arises from the social interaction of foreigners that immigrate to a country… 
The vulnerability of migrants depends on their probable lack of empowerment in the other country to the 
extent that they are labelled as different by nationals” (Bustamante, 2000, pp. 16-17 and 26). This notion 
of vulnerability, which implies that migrants are “virtually stripped of their human rights” (Bustamante, 
2000, p. 34), concerns an aspect of lack of protection or of risk which is relegated to second place by the 
approximations that focus on the net outcome of behaviour. The human rights dimension, often overlooked 
in former approaches, refers to the asymmetries between symbolic and material resources that 
characterize the actual structures of power.16 The extension of the notion of vulnerability to the vast field 
of rights paves the way for addressing the central issue of citizenship in modern societies. 
 
 
5. Social vulnerability: significance, concepts and analytical approaches 
 
A few basic conclusions may be drawn from the brief review that was made of research into social 
vulnerability, especially in relation to Latin America and the Caribbean, (see figure I.1): 
 
Figure I.1 
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16 Kaztman, participating in the international seminar, Las diferentes expresiones de la vulnerabilidad social 
in América Latina y el Caribe (ECLAC, Santiago, Chile, June 2001), declared that this was one of the outstanding 
issues to be studied with respect to vulnerability. 
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Source:  Population Division of ECLAC – Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE). 
 
 
(i) There is a growing interest in the concept of social vulnerability because it can be used to 
describe objective and subjective conditions of uncertainty and lack of protection and to 
understand fluctuations in the social mobility of communities, households and persons; it 
also offers an alternative, yet complementary, view to other approaches or concepts that 
are used to describe situations of social disadvantage, such as poverty and exclusion. 
 
(ii) The concept of social vulnerability does not have an exact definition, and hence various 
theoretical and operational definitions have been used in the practice of research (see 
box I.2); the variety of meanings, analytical approaches and attempts at implementation is 
due to the fact that vulnerability is inseparable from social life, which is characterized by 
changing risks. 
 
(iii) Continuously changing risks, especially in contexts of accelerated social change, are a 
permanent challenge to researchers and decision-makers and means that any comparison 
of abstract measurements of vulnerability, in contrast to those of other disadvantaged 












                                                 
17 Some authors maintain that contemporary risk can only be understood in its own context: "Taking these 
sociological considerations altogether, it becomes unmistakably clear that risk problems cannot be described 
adequately by referring to 'objective' statistical measurements as technical approaches of risk assessment assume. 
Causal approaches miss that risks are social constructions, attributed in various, context -dependent ways to 
decisions” (Tacke, 2001, p. 295). 
Box I.2 
MEASURING VULNERABILITY FOR DIFFERENT REFERENCE UNITS 
 
In a recent study (United Nations, 1998), the vulnerability of the economies of small island states was measured 
using indicators referring to: economic exposure (trade openness); export concentration; peripherality (costs of 
freight and insurance for imports); imported commercial energy; and foreign sources of financing. Three factors 
were also identified which contribute to the volatility of income of such States: instability of purchasing power 
of exports, instability of capital flows relative to GDP, and vulnerability to natural disasters (measured by the 
proportion of the population affected). 
 In order to measure environmental vulnerability to anthropogenic activities and natural risks, a 
composite index is used that includes a sub-index of exposure to risk, another of intrinsic resilience and a third 
relating to degradation of ecosystems. In some applications in countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, 39 
risk indicators were selected, 5 resilience indicators, and 13 for environmental degradation (Gómez, 2001). 
 In relation to vulnerability to social exclusion, in Spain data were used from a panel-type household 
survey designed by specialists from the European Unio n to characterize individuals according to their levels of 
human capital (education, health and work), social capital (network of relatives and friendships) and housing 
(characteristics and problems); those at greater risk of being in situations of exclusion and marginalization were 
defined as vulnerable (Busso, 2001). 
 In Latin America indices of social vulnerability have been developed that refer to one way of 
perceiving human security. In Bolivia, for example, the index consisted of a simple average of various indicators 
referring to culture, habitat, housing, education, employment and political participation. In Ecuador a weighted 
sum was calculated for five aspects of risk: illiteracy in the adult population, infant malnutrition, poverty in 


























(iv) An approach based on social vulnerability requires public policies that are: (i) dynamic, in 
the sense of being constantly in tune with the changing risks and requirements of modern 
life; (ii) diversified, integral and universal, so that they are appropriate to the nature of 
social risks, which are numerous, tend to accumulate and affect, to differing and complex 
degrees, all population groups; (iii) facilitating, with the objective of encouraging education 
and training of individuals to exercise their citizens' rights and to realize their aspirations; 
(iv) interconnected, as they must combine prevention, support and adaptation measures. 
 
(v) There are many sources of social vulnerability in Latin America and the Caribbean. One 
is the labour market, where risks manifest in increasingly precarious working conditions 
and the growing obstacles to creating productive and well-paid jobs (Stallings and Weller, 
2001; Tokman, 2001; Ocampo, 2001b; ECLAC 2000a, 2000b and 2000c). Another source 
of uncertainty is income volatility (of countries, local communities and households) for 
which there are few remedies (Rodrik, 2001; Destremau and Salama, 2001) and some 
remedies, such as child labour, are even harmful in the long term. Social inequity in the 
distribution of assets is clearly a historical source of vulnerability for a large part of the 
population and one dramatic result of this is the high levels of poverty and inequality of 
income. The consequences of this relative lack of assets are felt throughout society, both 
in terms of the disenfranchisement of a significant proportion of the human resources, and 
in many internal tensions, which range from criminality to social disturbances (Kliksberg, 
1999). The weakening of institutions that historically provided support and represented 
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interests such as the family, the State, communities, political parties, trade unions and 
associations (ECLAC, 2000a; Filgueira, 1998) constitutes a risk, as it reduces the capacity 
for response; although the erosion of these institutions is not in itself a sign of definitive 
crisis, as there have been more traumatic changes in the course of history (and the 
adaptation process that followed has resulted in social progress), it does bring uncertainty 
with respect to the future and current shortages for which there are no alternative support 
agencies. 
 
(vi) Social vulnerability is not new; its current notoriety is due to the combination of emerging 
risks with the deterioration in historical forms of protection. While the idea of increasing 
social vulnerability is thought-provoking, it is virtually impossible to evaluate it in practice 
owing to the enormous variety of risks involved and the fact that some of them also offer 
various opportunities. Furthermore, there is no unanimous agreement that the available 
evidence confirms some of the signs of emerging vulnerability highlighted in the research. 
Thus, in Latin America and the Caribbean, social spending, which is an indicator of 
protection of public activity, increased in recent years (ECLAC, 2000a, p. 57); similarly, 
despite the crises that affect them, there are signs of a new valuation for the role of the 
family and communities.18 
 
Finally, and taking into account these conclusions in the light of the basic analytical scheme of the 
components of social vulnerability, this notion may be understood as a combination of: (i) events, processes 
or characteristics which may pose obstacles to the exercise of the various kinds of citizens' rights19 or the 
success of projects undertaken by communities, households and individuals;20 (ii) the incapacity to respond 
to the materialization of these risks; and (iii) the inability to adapt to the consequences of the 
materialization of these risks. 
 
 
C. SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VULNERABILITY 
 
 
Several of the approaches to social vulnerability take some sociodemographic variables into account in 
their conceptual design and in their empirical applications. Thus, in a study on Peru, Glewwe and Hall 
(1995) found that the households affected by a sharper drop in income or consumption during economic 
crises included those with a large number of children and hence a high demographic dependence ratio. 
Jiménez and Ruedi (1998), in research on the determining factors of economic inequality among 
households in Latin America, also found a close relationship between demographic dependence and the 
level of per capita income. Moser (1998) includes the work of household members among the assets of 
                                                 
18 A recent paper claims that "The 'high modernization' period in Latin America (1970-90) was broadly 
characterized by a weak civil society and the depoliticization of society... Yet the period of the 1970s and 1980s also 
oversaw the mobilization of diverse groups of Latin American society into social movements and other forms of 
collective political action. How can we explain the paradox of apparent depoliticization together with mass 
mobilization around an innovatory set of political repertoires and new agendas?" (Radcliffe, 1999, p. 203). 
19 As suggested by Hopenhayn (2001, p. 118), expanding the original proposal of Marshall (Turner, 2002, pp. 
189-190), these rights include civil, political, economic, social, cultural and republican rights. 
20 Socio-economic development for communities, ascending social mobility for households, satisfactory 
social integration for individuals. 
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the asset vulnerability framework, but maintains that mobilization is difficult when there is a high proportion 
of children or elderly people, who are unable to work or, if they do, face negative impacts in the medium 
term. Along the same lines, studies of Latin American households show that the average number of 
children in households of the poorest quintile is double that of the households of the richest quintile 
(ECLAC, 2001a, p.111). 
 
In general, population may be regarded as an asset, depending on the its structure, as individuals 
generate income if they enter the work force.21 Moser (1998) adds that intrahousehold relations are an 
asset that depends on the structure, composition and cohesion of households; this implies recognizing a 
broader role for demographic variables in the configuration of social vulnerability. The emphasis on these 
variables is greater in the approach that considers assets and the structure of opportunities; Filgueira 
(1998) warns that the demographic transition and its method of socioeconomic dissemination originate in a 
scenario in which new risks —relating to progressive ageing of the population— are combined with other 
risks that existed previously, but are now stronger, such as the persistent threats facing children. He claims 
that these latter risks are now increasing because children are born in households less equipped to carry 
out basic functions, partly due to the fact that a larger number of families are incomplete, undermined by 
the weakening of marital ties, the increase in cohabitation and the absence of the father from the home 
(Filgueira, 2998, p. 130).22 An empirical study on Uruguay adds two other sociodemographic factors which 
cause social vulnerability: socioeconomic residential segregation in the cities and adolescent fertility 






                                                 
21 This reasoning is valid at the domestic scale, as "when the occupational income of the main breadwinner 
is inadequate, increasing occupational density is usually an effective way for a household to avoid or reduce the 
severity of poverty or to improve its prospects of social mobility" (ECLAC, 2000a, p. 85). It is also valid at the scale of 
communities, especially if a low ratio of demographic dependence opens a window of opportunity to take advantage 
of the relatively large proportion of potential producers (ECLAC, 2000b; IDB, 2000b; Chackiel, 2000). 
22 "The combined effects of increased divorce rates, postponement of marriage, teenage pregnancy, single 
mothers, single-parent households, together with longer life expectancy have challenged the security traditionally 
provided by the family" (Filgueira, 1998, p. 130). 
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1. Sociodemographic vulnerability: recent approaches and a working concept 
 
In the past few years research projects have been carried out that are devoted specifically to the study of 
sociodemographic vulnerability. One of them uses an approach based on the accumulation of social 
disadvantages to identify the sociodemographic features which have adverse effects on the social and 
domestic performance of households (Rodríguez, 2000). Although some of these features, such as high 
fertility and the high demographic dependence ratio, were observed in previous studies of the demographic 
dynamics of poverty, their joint analysis goes beyond the traditional view, as they have to be related to the 
budgetary and time restrictions inherent in an age composition with a high demographic dependence ratio, 
at stages of the life cycle when accumulation is difficult (for example, households headed by very young or 
elderly persons), and the instability and fragility of unions which, as well as involving gender biases, is an 
attack on development and damages the process of bringing up children. The combination of these 
sociodemographic risks gives rise to obvious disadvantages, and as such risks are understood to involve 
potential hardships, generate a situation of sociodemographic vulnerability for households; moreover, they 
may also erode the response and adaptation capacity of households in the face of external socioeconomic 
shocks. Sometimes it is a very narrow line that divides the components of the analytical scheme (risk, 
response and adaptability) and hence the analysis should be cautious, but this illustrates the quantity of 
issues which may be interpreted using an approach based on vulnerability.23 
 
Another line of research on sociodemographic vulnerability has been followed by the National 
Population Council (CONAPO) of Mexico, which deals simultaneously with various aspects (income, 
assets, exposure to environmental damage, lags in relation to reproductive health and location in 
marginalized areas) and their relationship to population variables. The risks examined include a high level 
of early fertility, a high demographic dependence ratio in households, the break-up of unions and dispersion 
and isolation of towns (CONAPO, 2001, pp. 219-226). Also, a conceptual link is postulated between social 
vulnerability, the phase of life and the demographic transition, for which some specific indicators are used 
(see box I.3). 
 
Taking advantage of the contributions of the two lines of research referred to, the concept of 
sociodemographic vulnerability used below is analogous to that of social vulnerability (equation [2], 
presented at the beginning of this chapter) and sociodemographic vulnerability is understood as a dynamic 
situation which is affected by: (i) sociodemographic risks, which are events, processes or characteristics 
that make it difficult to carry out community, domestic or individual projects or are limitations on rights; 
deficiencies in the capacity to take on such risks; and (iii) a lack of ability to adapt actively to them.24 This 
operational concept guides the empirical analysis, whose objective is to identify sociodemographic risks 
and their probable future scenarios, as well as specifying the factors that undermine the response capacity 
and adaptation abilities in relation to such risks. Although the three components referred to are equally 
important, only the first (risks) can be described exclusively in terms of population variables, for which 
                                                 
23 This research includes an index of sociodemographic vulnerability, and the results, which are consistent 
with the approach of accumulation of social disadvantages, illustrate the methodological difficulties of measurement. 
24 A vision based on opportunities, which is complementary to the approach based on vulnerability, can 
show that sociodemographic events, characteristics and processes also generate potential —use of which usually 
depends on the dynamics and policies in other social areas— favour the exercise of citizens' rights and, to some 
degree, constitute assets for the different reference units (Rodríguez, 2001c; IDB, 2000b; CELADE/IDB, 1996; 
ECLAC/CELADE, 1995, 1996). In view of this intrinsic ambivalence in population variables, this document focuses on 
demographic risks and not on opportunities. 
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reference is made to three long-term demographic processes; the other two components of vulnerability 
























2. Long-term sociodemographic processes 
 
In general, the treatment of sociodemographic risks in analyses of social vulnerability is limited in terms of 
the range of population variables considered and the comparative advantages of demography with regard 
to prediction are not taken into account (see box I.4). Experience shows that the basic processes of 
change in population take place over relatively extensive periods of time (even centuries) and that they 
have the special feature of beginning in some areas of the world and then disseminating, in a slow and 
specific way, around the globe. These changes are similar to the "long-term historical processes" identified 
by Braudel (1978); they are not "laws" —as nothing guarantees that they will reach the whole of humanity, 
or that their possible dissemination will follow a common pattern— but are probable changes. Each one of 
these processes models sociodemographic risk profiles that are relevant for communities, households, and 
individuals. 
 
With regard to population, the model for the long-term processes is the demographic transition, the 
central element of which is a sustained decline in birth and death rates. This transition is reflected in the 
growth rate, which shows an initial acceleration —mortality tends to fall earlier and more rapidly than birth 
rates— and a subsequent slow return to lower levels. It also affects the structure of the population, with 
an initial rejuvenation followed by an increase in the intermediate ages, to conclude with an increase in the 
proportion of elderly persons. Around this pattern, the historical processes of demographic transition differ 
significantly in aspects as important as the time of onset, the rapidity of change, initial and final levels of 
fertility and mortality, the role of the variables involved, such as nuptiality or epidemiology, and the methods 
Box I.3 
SOCIAL VULNERABILITY, PHASE OF LIFE AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION:  
AN APPLICATION IN MEXICO 
 
In an analysis of sociodemographic vulnerability, the National Population Council of Mexico (CONAPO) 
considers three central elements: (i) the phase of life of men and women, which consists of phases with specific 
vulnerabilities, such as infancy, adolescence, youth, the reproduction and labour phase, and old age; (ii) the 
basic rights that should be protected during each of these phases; and (iii) the stage of demographic transition. 
These three elements are used as a reference to propose four indicators of social vulnerability relating to phases 
of the life cycle. First, there are the socioeconomic conditions associated with children's health problems, 
including an excessive mortality level in infancy; these conditions include a low level of education of the mother 
(less than secondary level) and residence in homes with earth floors and a lack of potable water. Secondly there is 
a lack of compliance with a right that results in a severely debilitating social situation that affects children and 
young people: absence from school or dropping out. Thirdly, there is unprotected labour, without a contract that 
ensures respect for basic rights, including health and pension contributions, holidays, and institutional benefits. 
Lastly, there is the lack of institutional social security for the elderly, who are usually included in family 
households which at least provide them with some degree of protection. 
 
Source: National Population Council of Mexico (CONAPO) La población de México en el nuevo siglo, Mexico 
City, 2001, pp. 213-229. 
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of dissemination within the social structure (Hill, Morelos and Wong, 1999; Kirk, 1996; Zavala de Cosío, 














































PREVENTIVE CAPACITY OF DEMOGRAPHY 
 
One aspect of demography is that it can be used to make reliable projections of population changes in the long 
term, over periods of 50 years or more. In economics, in contrast, past history can be used to predict probable 
behaviour only over very short periods of time; in the latter discipline, the long term is restricted to about five 
years, as many variable go through stochastic oscillations, which may cause changes over periods of less than 
one year, or even of several days. 
 The choice of hypothesis is a key factor in developing reliable population projections. The most 
important decisions relate to the selection of appropriate fertility rates and mortality tables, and the forecast of 
migratory movements; however, owing to a lack of knowledge, the main inputs that are used at present refer to 
fertility and mortality, as migratory movements tend to be relegated to the category of correction factors. There 
are at least two reasons why fertility and mortality predictions may be more accurate than those for migration. The 
first is that age pyramids show the potential growth of a population: when there is a wide base, as in sub-Saharan 
Africa, the population may be assumed to have a high growth potential; on the other hand, a narrow base, as in 
Europe, indicates the reverse, implying possible negative growth. The second reason is that the evidence 
accumulated over centuries of research suggests that, in general, neither fertility nor mortality rates experience 
abrupt changes. 
 Despite the greater safety margin for population projections, they are exposed to random and 
unpredictable changes. Human history has included situations of war and natural catastrophes that have 
substantially modified any demographic projection made (for example, the millions of deaths in the two world 
wars, or, more recently, the large-scale massacres that took place in Ruanda). There have also been substantial 
migration movements, fertility explosions, such as the baby boom after the second world war, and the decline in 
the 1970s. All of these factors are the weak point of demographic projections, as they cannot be predicted by any 
theory of population growth. 
 The first demographic projections were not based on the use of explicit hypotheses. On the premise that 
populations followed a pattern of growth according to precise laws, it was believed that the population could be 
estimated for a future moment in time merely by measuring the current growth rate, and then applying it over the 
necessary period. Malthus, in his Essay on the Principle of Population (1798) suggested that population grew at a 
geometric rate. Later, in the nineteenth century, Quêtelet, and then Verhulst, replaced the law of geometric growth 
with one of logistical growth, according to which the growth rate diminished proportionally with the size of the 
population. One significant task for the demographer is to anticipate changes in the factors that directly 
determine growth. This is done by means of observation of extensive past series to extract trends that are then 
extrapolated. It is not an infallible method, but there is a second method that is usually used to correct the results 
of the first, which consists of looking for reference populations that have followed a development similar to what 
is expected for the population being studied. 
 Taking all of these factors into account, demography is a discipline that can be used to make very 
reliable projections for periods of between 5 and 10 years, reasonable ones for between 25 and 40 years, and not 
entirely unrealistic ones for a period of 100 years. 
 
Source: Based on J. Vallin, "La Demografía", series E, No. 41 (LC/DEM/G.147), Santiago, Chile, Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 199, pp. 131-139. 


















































THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION: APPLICABILITY, GENERAL FEATURES AND  
SPECIFIC ASPECTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
 
The core of the classical model of demographic transition, which is a sustained decline in fertility and mortality, is 
applicable to Latin America and the Caribbean; the region's development is linked to a set of socioeconomic and 
value changes (urbanization, secularization, wage labour and an instrumental rationale), which can be described 
generically by the term "modernization" (CELADE, 1995). Beyond this general vision, however, the demographic 
transition has specific features in the countries of the region. Some of them are clearly demogra phic and are 
related to the time at which the process begins, its speed, the high initial fertility levels and the widespread nature 
of the marital union. Other specific features are socioeconomic in nature. The European transition, and in general 
that of the industrialized countries, developed together with a structural socioeconomic change which in the long 
term generated an increase, not exempt from fluctuations, in the standard of living and economic activity; the 
positive interaction of the two processes provided those countries not only with sufficient time to adapt their 
structures and institutions to the emerging demographic scenarios, which could be predicted beforehand (apart 
from exceptions, such as the "baby boom" or post-war surge in the birth rate), but also resources to deal with the 
new challenges caused by the demographic change (Hill, Morelos and Wong, 1999; Kirk, 1996; Livi-Bacci, 1994; 
Vallin, 1994). In Latin America and the Caribbean the process was much more rapid, as various countries 
experienced a true demographic revolution in just 30 years, with the consequent shortage of time to introduce 
socioeconomic and institutional adjustments to match the emerging demographic dynamic. In addition, the 
manifest asymmetry between the rapidity of demographic change and the slower and more volatile pace of 
socioeconomic development makes it likely that the region will become the first in the world with a basic 
demographic dynamic (fertility and mortality rates) of a developed country and the standards of living and level 
of economic activity of a developing country. This is a cause for concern, as for a certain period of time (and 
various countries are already at this stage) the specific needs must be met of the earlier stages of the transition, 
such as steady growth in the working age population (ECLAC, 2000b; CELADE/IDB, 1996), and those of the 
advanced stage, such as ageing of the population. 
 Although these particular features separate the Latin American and Caribbean experience from the 
classical model, especially the European one, they also make it similar to other recent demographic transition 
processes, such as those occurring in South-East Asia (IDB, 2000b; Tabah, 1989), where since the mid-1950s 
there have been drastic declines in fertility, even more intense than in Latin America and the Caribbean. On the 
whole, an in -depth review could identify various differences between the latter two regions, such as the pre -
transitional fertility levels, synchrony between the demographic transition and economic development and the 
degree of social heterogeneity. In the countries of South-East Asia it is clear that there are no fertility floors 
(United Nations, 2000). Its transition process, as well taking place in conjunction with accelerated economic 
growth and an improvement in living conditions, contributed decisively to socioeconomic development 
(McGuire, 2001; IDB, 2000b), so that these countries are better prepared for the challenges of the post-transition 
period, in particular to meet the growing needs of the elderly. Finally, experience shows that in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, the differences between socioeconomic segments within countries have increased and are 
persisting. Although some countries have had success in reducing demographic inequalities among 
socioeconomic groups, in many the inequities with regard to income have remained, or are becoming more acute. 
 
Source : J. McGuire, “Social policy and mortality decline in east Asia and Latin America”, World Development, vol. 29, No. 10, 
2001; Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Desarrollo más allá de la economía. Progreso económico y social en 
América Latina.  Informe 2000, Washington, D.C., 2000; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) Equity, development and citizenship  (LC/G.2071(SES.28/3)), Santiago de Chile, 2000; United Nations, 
"World Population Monitoring" (ESA/P/WP.159), New York, United Nations Population Division, draft version, 2000; 
K. Hill, J. Morelos and R. Wong (coords.), Las consecuencias de las transiciones demográfica y epidemiológica en 
América Latina: memoria del seminario internacional, Mexico City, El Colegio de México, 1999; D. Kirk, “The 
demographic transition”, Population Studies, vol. 50, No. 3, London, 1996; Latin American Demographic Centre/Inter-
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In view of its importance, the path of demographic transition tends to be the only long-term 
process that is included in population and development analyses, which causes two problems; the first is 
that the theory of demographic transition rests on the premise that populations go from a stage of 
equilibrium between high levels of fertility and mortality and low demographic growth to another stage at 
which the reduced levels of both variables also result in low growth (United Nations, 2000; Kirk, 1996; 
Vallin, 1994, p. 146). This implies that there are fertility floors, as otherwise the population would continue 
to decline and the equilibrium would be lost: "...transition theory sets a limit on the decline in fertility (2.05 
children per woman)" (Vallin, 1994, p. 149).25 In this scenario, it is frequently supposed that the 
demographic risks will disappear as the transition progresses, which seems to contradict the historical 
evidence. The second problem is that exclusive concentration of analytical efforts on the "classical" 
demographic transition means omitting a review of two other long-term demographic processes that have 
a decisive impact on the configuration of sources of social vulnerability: the urban and mobility transition, 
and the second demographic transition. 
 
In its most basic form, the central element of the urban transition is a sustained increase in the 
percentage of the urban population and demographic lethargy in rural areas, which is accompanied by a 
change in the national mobility patterns in favour of transfers between cities and moves within 
metropolitan areas. This transition is usually associated with the establishment of a new pattern of 
international migration, consisting of flows which are mainly directed from poor countries to rich ones, and 
which face antagonistic forces, as the greater facility of movements is set against growing regulatory 
restrictions in the destination countries (ECLAC, 2002). Some authors have developed urban transition 
models using a logic similar to that of the demographic transition (see box I.6), and others have 





















                                                 
25 Not all the experts agree with the implicit assumption of homeostasis in the theory or with the supposed 
fertility floors (United Nations, 2000, pp. 13-16; Demeny, 2001). 
Box I.6 
THE URBAN AND MOBILITY TRANSITION 
 
In 1971, the United States geographer Wilburg Zelinsky introduced the idea of the mobility transition, a 
concept that is highly interactive with the process of urbanization. According to this approach, the direction 
and magnitude of migration flows take on different characteristics in each of the five stages of development of 
the societies that the author considers. In pre-modern traditional societies there is little real migration, as 
mobility is related to land-use practices, trade rules, customs for social visits and religious rituals. In societies 
in the initial stage of transition there is mass migration from the country to the cities and to new settlement 
areas; there is also a higher level of international migration and the significance of various national mobility 
circuits increases. In societies at an advanced stage of transition, migration to the cities increases, as well as 
the mobility circuits between urban areas. In advanced societies migration to the cities is reduced, both in 
relative and absolute terms, high levels of interurban exchanges are generated, international migration from 
poor countries to rich ones increases, international circulation of qualified workers begins and movements to 
new settlement areas reduce drastically. Finally, in future super-advanced societies, the rate of migration 
involving a change of residence decelerates, but inter-urban mobility increases and there is strict control of 
international migration, although international circulation is on the ascent. 
 
Source:  W. Zelinsky, "The hypothesis of the mobility transition", Geographical Review, No. 61, 1971. 
 




 The expression "second demographic transition", coined in 1986 by the European demographers 
Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk van de Kaa, describes a set of changes in marital and reproductive conduct that 
have taken place in the countries of Western Europe since the 1960s. This transition, in addition to bringing 
fertility indices much lower than the replacement level, which some researchers perceive as features of 
the posttransitional stage of the classical demographic transition, consists of an increase in the proportion 
of unmarried people, delayed marriage, postponement of the first child, an increase in consensual unions 
and births outside of marriage, a greater frequency of marital breakdowns and diversification of family 
structures. According to Lesthaeghe (1998) and van de Kaa (1987), these changes reflect a profound 
cultural transformation, together with the model of late modernity proposed by Giddens (1998, 1997b and 
1997c), in which individuality plays a central role, there is reflexivity in all spheres of life and the 
implementation of personal projects meets new options and requirements; van de Kaa, however, postulates 
that the basis of the second transition is post-modern values (see box I.7). Beyond the conceptual 
differences, various elements bring together the different viewpoints as to the material and symbolic basis 
on which the second demographic transition rests; they include the growing pre-eminence of the self-
centred individual, a cultural figure which, in the long term, will tend to spread from the countries of 
Western Europe to the rest of the globe, thus helping to disseminate this second demographic transition. 
 
Using these three long-term processes as analytical tools, different theoretical and stylized 
scenarios may be distinguished in relation to sociodemographic risk, some of them diachronic, that can be 
used to organize this presentation (see figure I.2). Thus, the following chapters deal with the risks inherent 
in the delay in the classical demographic transition and those associated with adolescent fertility, the 
control of reproductive behaviour (especially the imbalance between wishes and reproductive experience), 
the changes in the age structure caused by demographic oscillations and ageing, and the morbidity and 
mortality profile. They also consider the risks inherent in increasing urbanization —with particular 
reference to residential segregation— and to international migration. Lastly, some risks are identified 
which are linked to the degree of progress in the second demographic transition. In each of the processes 
an effort is made to distinguish between traditional risks —such as those relating to the transitional delay— 
and emerging ones —such as those brought by ageing. Identification of risks and their development refers 
to communities, households and persons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and their consideration 
includes consideration of the capacities for response and adaptation abilities. 
 
 The link between sociodemographic and social vulnerability is based on previous studies that 
emphasize the difficulties posed by sociodemographic events, characteristics or processes (risks) for the 
exercise of rights or the development of the life cycle of the reference units. Another connection arises 
from the review of the response capacity and adaptability of those units; the analysis attempts to find out 
which communities, households and persons are most affected by sociodemographic risks and investigates 
possible processes of accumulation of disadvantages that could threaten their response capacity or lead to 
harmful adaptation processes in the long term. Although this approach to sociodemographic vulnerability is 
similar to that used in studies on the demographic dynamics of poverty, it is different in that it considers 
risks that are not exclusive to the situation of poverty and investigates topics (response capacity and 
adaptability) that do not depend only on socioeconomic position. In the chapter on policies, this approach 
will be expressed in its full complexity in order to present a range of options for intervention that are rarely 
included in studies on the interconnections of population and development. 
















































SECOND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION, MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNITY 
 
The theory of the existence of a second demographic transition began to be developed at the end of the 1980s, 
when van de Kaa and Lesthaeghe drew attention to the coincidence of two phenomena: (i) the consolidation 
of a reproductive pattern that is below the replacement level, which breaks with the homeostatic assumption 
inherent in the demographic transition, which would be long-term equilibrium in a stationary population; (ii) 
the increasing postponement of marriage and the first child, significant indications of the erosion of the marital 
institution, due both to the fact that cohabitation is becoming a general and permanent alternative to the 
formal marital union and to the ever-increasing fragility of formal unions, as indicated by the increase in 
divorce rates. 
 This second demographic transition is essentially cultural. Although it may be thought that this 
implies individual behaviour and decisions that are taken in relation to socioculturally constituted normative 
frameworks, that also occurs in the case of the classical demographic transition. The cultural essence of this 
second transition must be found, rather, in determining factors that are mainly based on the level of value 
changes. On the whole, these determining elements have a material basis, which, as claimed by Lesthaeghe, 
"explanations solely relying on either the ideational changes or on structural economic factors are non-
redundant, yet insufficient" (van de Kaa, 2001, p. 301). But the material basis is not restricted to the 
functioning of the economy and society, but rather relates to technology. The "contraceptive revolution", one 
of the pillars of which is the mass availability of more efficient methods of avoiding pregnancy, considerably 
increased the range of demographic options for successive cohorts from the 1960s onwards, but these options 
developed within a profound cultural transformation with regard to sexual and reproductive matters. The 
feedback between technological change and cultural change managed to bring about a situation where an area 
as essentially intimate as reproduction is increasingly subject to the control of individuals. 
Despite the significance of its socioeconomic and technological bases, the second demographic 
transition is based on a definite cultural pattern. Van de Kaa (2001) described it as a result of the consolidation 
of post-modern values together with post-materialist values. With the progress of modernization, "materialist" 
priorities such as survival and economic achievement are giving place to other values that are post-materialist, 
such as quality of life; this is possible to the extent that the first needs are satisfied, as post-materialist values 
emphasize the personal choice of lifestyle and free expression of individuality (Inglehart, 1998). Although they 
probably come from different conceptual viewpoin ts, these proposals concerning post-modernity and post-
materialism share many elements of Giddens' premises on late modernity, which emphasizes the importance of 
individual reflexivity, personal choice, life project and lifestyle in an advanced stage of modernity (Giddens, 
1998, 1997b and 1997c). The cultural links that these discourses on modernity seem to come close to are: the 
obligation of permanent individual choices, the self-centred and reflexive individual and the acceptance of 
diversity. 
 Even when the theoretical development relating to the second transition remains open, some 
researchers propose quite firm ideas on what can be done and expected; van de Kaa, in particular, considers 
that if adequately defined, the concept of a post-modern value framework offers a solid foundation for 
conceptual investigation: "The change in value orientations involved is well documented in the shift towards 
postmaterialism and, one must assume, in the postulated broader shift toward postmodernity. The 
demographic patterns resulting from the second demographic transition, I should like to argue, have to reflect 
the advent of the postmodern era.” (van de Kaa, 2001, p. 302). Further, he postulates a general outline for 
progress in the second demographic transition similar to that of the dissemination capacity of the classical 
demographic transition: "As societies develop, the classic demographic transition will inevitably follow. At an 
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Figure I.2 
THREE LONG-TERM DEMOGRAPHIC PROCESSES: 




DEMOGRAPHIC DYNAMICS OF UNDER-DEVELOPMENT: THE SITUATION IN THE REGION UP TO THE 












BASIC FEATURES High and early fertility 
Accelerated population 
growth 
Age structure with high 
level of child dependence 
Accelerated urbanization 
Migration from the country to 
the city 
International immigration and 
intraregional migration 
Does not exist 
COMMUNITIES 
Aggregate trends 
Significant life uncertainties  
Growing pressure on the 
resource base 
Concentration on 




Complex integration of rural 
migrants  
Rural dispersion 
Does not exist 
HOUSEHOLDS 
Structure and life 
cycle  
Most of resources and time 
needed for raising children 
Urban expansion owing to the 
arrival of migrants from the 
country  
Diseconomies of scale, 
overcrowding, internal 
conflicts  
Loss of members of productive 
age in rural households 
Rural dispersion 




Unexpected events  
Standards and 
attitudes  
Less time for  accumulation 
of assets and  human capital 
owing to high morbidity rate 
Incompatibilities between 
raising children and 
education of parents  
Concentration of domestic 
burd en on women 
Exclusion and discrimination 
against rural migrants  
"Short -sighted" migration 
Rural dispersion 




DEMOGRAPHIC DYNAMICS OF DEVELOPMENT WITH SOCIOECONOMIC SUB -DEVELOPMENT: THE 












BASIC FEATURES Low fertility and mortality  
Slow growth 
Older age structure  
High urban percentage 
Slow rate of urbanization 
Migration between and within 
cities  
Growing international 
emigration to developed 
countries  
Fertility levels below 
the replacement level 
Increase in proportion 
of single people and 
delayed marriage 
Postponement of first 
child  
Increase in consensual 
unions and births 
outside of marriage 
Higher frequency of 
marital breakdowns 




Ageing, which implies: 
Demand for complex and 
expensive health services  
Social security needs 
Intergenerational conflicts  
Institutional imbalances  
Socioeconomic and cultural 
rigidity 
Not predicted by the theory  Declining population: 
Questions about under-
use of production 
capacity and scarcity of 
labour 
Institutional imbalances  
Increase in transaction 
costs (divorce) 
Erosion of the family, 
the key social 
institution for 
socialization and 
training of human 
resources  
HOUSEHOLDS 
Structure and life 
cycle  
Ageing, which implies: 
Loss of assets owing to 
reduced income and 
additional costs  
Dependence on external 
support  
Intra-family conflicts  
 
Not predicted by the theory  Family breakdowns and 
associated 
socioeconomic and 
psychological costs  
Extension of the period 
of dependence of 
young people  
Fragility and instability 
of unions 
One-parent families and 
associated difficulties 




Unexpected events  
Ageing, which implies: 
Illness and handicaps 
Dependence 
Lack of definition of roles  
Not predicted by the theory  The problem of feeling: 
Ontological uncertainty 
Erosion of key anchors , 
such as children 
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Standards and 
attitudes  
Exclusion from decision 
making 
 
Dilution of resources 
and networks on 
account of divorce 
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SCENARIO 3 











BASIC FEATURES Fluctuations of cohorts  
Uncertainty as to the 
convergence of fertility and 
mortality, and fertility timing 
Adolescent fertility 
Discrepancies between 
desired and observed fertility 
High urban percentage 
Slow urbanization 
Migration between and 
within cities  
Growing international 
emigration to developed 
countries  
Lag in the management of 
reproductive behaviours  
Out-of-date institutional 
structure in view of denial 
of new patterns of 
behaviour (sexual 
behaviour and fertility 




Fluctuations that bring 
generation conflicts, co-
existence of sectoral 
demands and "social 
problems” associated with 
relative size of age groups 
(adolescence and youth: 
criminality) 
Persistence of gaps that 
contribute to reproducing 
social and gender inequities  
Morbidity and mortality not 
linked to ageing is resistant 
to change: violence, 
accidents, and some sexually 
transmitted diseases  
Adolescent fertility resistant 
to change: loss of human 
resources (parents), services 
and support needs and low 
education potential 
(sons/daughters) 
Desired fertility: questioning 
of basic rights  
Persistent rural dispersion 





segregation and horizontal 
expansion 
Loss of qualified human 
resources because of 
international emigration 
Dependence on foreign 
currency from remittances  
 
Limitation for training of 
human resources  
Corruption, use of legal 
devices or informal 
mechanisms (sometimes 
risky or illegal) to 
"resolve" issues for which 
the current institutional 
framework has no 
response (access to 
reproductive health for 
adolescents, divorce, 
children outside marriage) 
Emerging processes of 
inequity of opportunity; 
those who do not control 
their reproductive 
behaviour, those who are 
deprived of their rights for 




Structure and life 
cycle  
Persistence off excess 
fertility and mortality 
Pressure on the family 
budget on account of 
adolescent pregnancies  
Es tablishment of precarious 
households because of 
adolescent pregnancy 
Conflicts between partners  
Rural dispersion 
Dependence on remittances  
Segregation 
Family separation owing to 
international emigration 
Intergenerational conflicts 







Unexpected events  
High fertility is an obstacle 
to asset accumulation  
Adolescent fertility shortens 
educational process 
Discrimination, exclusion 
and lack of defence of 
international migrants  
Obstacles to implementing 
personal projects  
Social and economic 
discrimination owing to 
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Standards and 
attitudes  




owing to contradictory 
messages  
Source: Population Division of ECLAC - Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE). 
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A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 
How can communities, households and individuals deal with sociodemographic vulnerability? First, it is 
necessary to be aware that it exists, that current demographic trends do not eliminate but only alter it, and 
that it is important because it limits people’s ability to exercise their rights and constrains the pursuit of 
collective, household and individual endeavours. Second, it must be understood that the long time horizon of 
demographic processes makes it possible to anticipate future scenarios with a greater degree of precision 
than in other social sciences. In turn, this facilitates and encourages early interventions designed to prevent 
adversities from worsening. For this reason, decision-makers must be made aware of the benefits of 
taking proper advantage of the long-term nature of these phenomena because —inertia being a major 
component of some demographic risks— failure to act early will mean that much larger efforts will need 
to be deployed in the future. Third, a number of the measures that can be taken to reduce 
sociodemographic vulnerability can result in gains for all the actors involved (win-win policies), although 
part of these dividends may be contingent upon the simultaneous effects of other policies. Fourth, there are 
three fronts on which measures can be deployed (see figure V.1): prevention, or averting the 
materialization of the risk; strengthening of response capacity, which refers to the ability to react once the 
adverse effects of the risk have manifested themselves; and enhancement of active adaptability, which 
consists of making endogenous changes to adapt to the scenario generated by the materialization of the 
risk.1 
 
There is a repertory of preventive policies and the choice depends, among other factors, on the 
nature of the sociodemographic risk. It is possible to strengthen the actors’ capacity to respond to the 
adverse consequences caused by the materialization of the risk by means of anticipatory policies, palliative 
measures and defensive strategies, which may or may not be publicly assisted. Enhancing adaptability 
requires an initial assessment of the nature of the risk. If the risk is judged avoidable, adaptation would, in 
principle, be counterproductive. If not, a course of action would be to develop policies, incentives, 
regulatory frameworks, awareness-raising measures and institutional and legal reforms intended to 
remodel community, household or individual behaviour patterns in order to align them with the risks. 









                                                 
1 This chapter focuses on the fourth point. The distinction between prevention, reaction/defence and 


































B. BASES OF POLICIES TO COMBAT SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VULNERABILITY 
 
 
Until the 1990s, population and development policies were based on the evaluation of the objective effects 
of sociodemographic variables on the evolution and living conditions of communities, households and 
individuals. If a set of sociodemographic features and trends obstructed the development of communities, 
the wellbeing of households and the social advancement of individuals, then it would be “objectively” 
beneficial to change them. This view gave rise to preventive policies geared towards averting risks and 
trends that were perceived as obstacles, particularly those which appeared to encumber the development 
of national communities. In consequence, an emphasis came to be placed on rapid population growth as a 
barrier to economic and social progress in poor countries. Policies took on an openly macrosocial bias 
(aggregate relationships between population variables and processes of socioeconomic development), and 
often specified quantitative demographic targets.2 
                                                 
2 Mexico is a typical case. The enactment of the General Population Law in 1973 
(www.cddhcu.gob.mx/leyinfo) was followed, in 1977, by the National and Regional Demographic Policy, 1978-1982, 
Sociodemographic
risks





















Response to adversities deriving from the materialization of
 preventable, short-term, unambiguously negative risks
 (support for adolescent mothers)
Palliative programmes: assistance networks,
social safety nets and social insurance, social
 and political mobilization and dialogue
Active adjustment to adversities
caused by the materialization of
inevitable or ambiguous risks
(opportunities)
Structural reforms
Institutional, cultural and technological
changes
Diversification of production
(economy of senior-citizen care)
Enabling policies: sectoral and cross-sectoral policies to increase
 assets and develop skills for taking appropriate decisions for
preventing, responding to and adapting to sociodemographic risks
(education, community organization)
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This line of argument was based on the twofold supposition that experts were able to identify 
precisely those sociodemographic trends that were obstructing development, and that the social players 
were aware of them. The initiatives designed by the experts and the images and aspirations of the actors 
were therefore judged to coincide. Another supposition was that the removal of sociodemographic 
obstacles would raise living conditions for communities, households and individuals in a virtually direct and 
inevitable manner. These premises had their limitations, however. First, there was lengthy debate among 
experts on how to identify those demographic features or processes that were “obstructing” development. 
Second, once the first measures geared specifically towards altering demographic behaviour had been 
prepared, it became clear that their proposed objectives were not based on the perceptions and 
expectations of the population. What is more, it was concluded that the aspirations of individuals in their 
natural state did not constitute a solid basis for government intervention, and that raison d’état should 
prevail over the rationale of the people; thus what is known as the “isolation paradox” and, in particular, its 
negative externalities,3 were brandied a as basis for government intervention in birth control, even in the 
absence of explicit wishes of the population in this regard. Lastly, the regional experience has also made it 
clear that there are no demographic solutions to problems of development, wellbeing, poverty and social 
mobility. Although sociodemographic changes in the last 30 years have coincided with the objectives 
sought by policy-makers and have, in general, been welcomed by the actors —albeit a case of inducement 
to some extent— they have not proven to be the key to the sustained improvement of economies and 
societies. 
 
In the light of this, it should come as no surprise that the 1990s produced a strategic change in the 
basis of sociodemographic policies. Without prejudice to the relevance and validity of the previous 
approach, this new line of thinking focused on rights as the ultimate justification for any intervention in the 
field of population and development. By contrast with the macrosocial bias of previous population policies, 
the new approach “emphasizes the integral linkages between population and development and focuses on 
meeting the needs of individual women and men, rather than on achieving demographic targets” (United 
Nations, 1995, p. 1). Another important aspect of this new approach is its indissoluble link with the 
empowerment of women, which represents a break with the classic debate over which comes first, 
development or fertility control. The improvement of women’s status is a matter that cannot wait for 
development to expand (or trickle down), but must be advanced immediately. This makes it necessary to 
foster demographic changes fairly independently of the progress of socioeconomic development. 
 
Although the invocation of the rights of individuals and couples is not new (Singh, 1998), its pre-
eminence suggests that policies intended to combat sociodemographic vulnerability should focus on the 
relative risks of disregard for the basic rights of individuals. In the sociodemographic field these range 
widely, from the right to life and health (avoidable mortality) to the right to move freely through the 
national territory and across its borders, passing through sexual and reproductive rights. The primacy 
afforded to rights, which in principle come before the objective consequences of behaviour patterns, does 
                                                                                                                                                             
which set explicit targets for the period 1978-2000. The natural annual rate of growth of the population was to decline 
gradually, to 2.5% in 1982, 1.9% in 1988 and 1.4% in 1994, in order to reach 1% in 2000. Federal agencies were also set 
targets in line with the national ones (CONAPO, undated, p. 75). 
3 This argument is still used today, ironically enough, to justify pronatalist measures: “Parental decisions on 
the number of children they have may have results in positive aggregate growth that is socially too high, or negative 
growth that is recognized as socially harmful” (Demeny, 2001, pp. 23-32). 
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not release the State from responsibility. Quite the opposite, as State involvement is crucial in the 
assurance of demographic rights and, although the State should not impose models of behaviour, it can 
encourage those considered beneficial and can take action in the event of conflicts of rights between 
individuals or among individuals, households and communities. 
 
 The fact that policies to combat sociodemographic vulnerability have a right-based rationale gives 
them legitimacy, because they effectively become a channel for the realization of mandates reached by 
consensus within the national or international community. Nonetheless, the scope of the rights approach is 
an insufficient basis for all measures to combat sociodemographic vulnerability, because not all 
sociodemographic risks stem from disregard for or infringement of rights. Some derive from the dynamics 
of population on an aggregate scale  which escape the real and debated status of the rights of individuals, 
households and communities. Other sociodemographic risks even grow out of progress in the observance 
of certain rights; examples are rights associated with longer life spans and ageing and the right to free 
decision on reproductive matters, which can lead to a free fall in fertility rates. 
 
Although the rights approach has huge moral substance, its weaknesses vis-à-vis implementation 
can consign it a declaratory role, unable to mobilize actors or generate incentives for changing structures 
or behaviour patterns. In addition, conflicts between public and private (community and individual) interests 
and rights cannot always be resolved by appealing to the pre-eminence of individual rights. Under certain 
circumstances, constraints on the rights of the individual can even attract social and institutional approval; 
apart from the exceptional situations provided for in national legislation, such restrictions can be justified on 
the basis of the individual good (in the case of conduct that is harmful to the individual) or the common 
good (conduct that undermines the rights or wellbeing of other individuals). Lastly, with respect to a 
number of sociodemographic risks, intervention means discouraging certain patterns of conduct, and this 
requires the public authorities to follow a course of action that does not necessarily coincide with the 
wishes of individuals. 
 
In short, policies to combat sociodemographic vulnerability are strongly based on the rights 
approach, insofar as consensus exists that no intervention may infringe the rights of individuals. In this 
regard, citizen participation is crucial for the promotion, design and implementation of policies. The rights 
of individuals are not the only rationale for such policies, however. Policy interventions continue to be 
steered by the aspiration to instigate demographic trends that can contribute to the sustainable and 
equitable development of communities, the wellbeing of households and the realization of individual 
endeavours. In the light of this, technical expertise is a basic requirement in order to identify the possible 
outcomes of different sociodemographic features or processes for communities, households and 
individuals. Expert research, citizen participation, institutional development and financial considerations are 
all of a piece with policy measures and, as well, serve to assess different types of sociodemographic risk 
and their foreseeable trends, determine the most appropriate technical means of dealing with them and 
make choices between preventive, reactive/defensive and adaptive measures. As a response mechanism, 
citizen participation may take several forms —from community solidarity networks to social mobilization— 
and it is also a tool for the defence of existing rights and the recognition of new ones. Institutional 
development facilitates the coordination of public policies and the adaptation of rules to emerging 
sociodemographic processes. Financial considerations are unavoidable in a field in which experience has 
demonstrated the high rate of social and private return on spending and in which, moreover, it is easy to 
fall into the trap of proclaiming rights without the material support to ensure their observance. 
 





C. PREVENTIVE MEASURES 
 
1. Rationality, advantages and limitations of preventive measures 
 
The prevention of sociodemographic risks consists of deploying efforts intended to avoid their becoming 
reality. This is the purpose of public policies —“any organized form of action aimed at achieving objectives 
of collective interest rather than being restricted to objectives of the State” (ECLAC, 2000b, p. 11)— or 
measures taken privately, by the community or autonomous non-governmental agencies. Policies are 
implemented through a number of mechanisms —laws, regulations, incentives, sectoral or multi-sectoral 
measures, investments, informative and educational campaigns— and their outcomes may be evaluated by 
means of different procedures. While the key parameter of this evaluation is a reduction in the relative 
frequency of the risk, the social distribution of that reduction and its costs are also relevant factors. 
 
Prevention of the risks of sociodemographic vulnerability has at least two great merits. First, it 
generates a more secure and favourable environment for the actors, whose world thus becomes less 
threatening. Second, the social and economic costs involved are usually lower than those incurred by 
measures to mitigate or alter effects that have already materialized. Preventive action —which obviates 
the need for expenditure to respond or adapt to the materialization of adverse effects— enshrines major 
“forward economies”;4 in consequence, there is a broad political and technical consensus that priority must 
be afforded to preventive policies in dealing with social and sociodemographic risks. 
 
Prevention alone is not enough to deal with sociodemographic risks, however. One reason for this 
is that many occurrences are simply not preventable, either because they are stochastic events that cannot 
be modelled or foreseen on the basis of contemporary knowledge (such as economic cycles), or because 
they cannot be managed with the technological media currently available (such as many environmental and 
sanitary problems). Another reason is that the prevention of social risks is unlikely to eradicate them 
altogether, as the causal relationships is this regard are non-deterministic. Prevention, therefore, implies 
reducing the probability of the risk becoming reality or limiting the impact of its realization to a smaller 
number of reference units than would have been affected had no measures been taken.5 The third reason 
is that social risks often contain some degree of ambiguity, as they combine potential threats and 
opportunities (such as globalization). In this case, generic preventive action is inappropriate, even if valid 
with respect to the most obvious potential threats. 
 
 
2. Successes, controversies and requirements with regard to  
prevention of sociodemographic risks 
 
Prevention has proved to be highly effective in dealing with a number of sociodemographic risks, notable 
examples being the prevention of high mortality, high fertility and, by extension, rapid population growth. 
This success must be measured in terms of the scope and promptness of the transformation, and by the 
                                                 
4 The advantages of preventive action is especially obvious in the area of health: “Preventive medicine is of 
inestimable value to the betterment of health which, in most cases, is appreciated only once it has been lost” (Filho, 
1999, p. 161). 
5 For this reason, communities, households and individuals  affected by the risk must react to defend 
themselves, which requires a different —no longer preventive— type of policies, interventions and actions. 
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fact that it took place in the context of economic crisis, changes in government and social disturbances. 
Unquestionably, this is no small merit in a region frequently beset by financial volatility and political 
instability and lacking institutional memory and a history of perseverance with public policies. In 
conclusion, it is feasible to implement preventive measures —which usually have a high rate of return. 
 
Short of entering into a detailed description of prevention initiatives in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, it is possible to identify three different ways in which decisions and actions on the part of public 
and non-governmental actors are manifested. First, the preventive approach from the standpoint of the 
State which, undaunted in the face of opposition from interest groups, broadcasts clear messages 
regarding the consequences of individual decisions and conducts for individuals, households and 
communities. The most obvious example of the design and implementation of such a policy is Mexico, 
whose National Population Council (CONAPO) acts as the main agent of awareness-raising, institutional 
coordination, follow-up of targets and systematization of technical information in this regard. This does not 
mean, however, that such agencies have been the direct executors of the measures in question, since most 
of the principal efforts to prevent sociodemographic risks are conducted by other bodies, many of which 
are sectoral in nature (witness the influence of the health sector on the course of the demographic 
transition). The example of Mexico is not to suggest that the State’s only option is to create a high-level 
governmental body formally commended with the responsibility. The purpose can also be achieved by 
means of a clear, consistent policy to orient the actors involved (whether public or otherwise), define 
technical and value criteria of measures and identify suitable incentives and activities to achieve its 
objectives. 
 
The second way in which the decisions of the actors with regard to prevention are manifested is in 
the formulation of appropriate policies and priorities, based on budgetary exercises and encompassing 
sectoral measures and long-term programmes to create qualified human resources. The major efforts of 
the region’s countries to reduce child mortality are an example of this. The acknowledged fruits of these 
efforts (ECLAC, 2001a) were built upon a vigorous and committed expansion of primary health care, with 
an emphasis on coverage for the poor and open and efficient targeting of resources on the mother-child 
binomial (see box V.1). Favourable influences also came from progress in other areas of social 
development, in particular from education. Programmes geared towards preventing HIV/AIDS contagion 





































The third way in which actors are able to manifest their preferences with regard to prevention is 
through the active and responsible intervention of civil society, non-governmental organizations and 
international agencies, which have woven a network of awareness-raising, promotion and assistance 
around specific and clearly delineated objectives. This network complements that of the public sector and, 





CHILD MORTALITY: THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL WILL 
AND ITS TRANSLATION INTO CONCRETE MEASURES  
 
A study on social policies and child mortality, which compares two experiences in East Asia (Republic of Korea 
and Taiwan, Province of China) and two in Latin America (Chile and Costa Rica), concludes that different 
strategies were responsible for the heavy decline in child mortality recorded in each region. In East Asia emphasis 
was afforded to a policy of “shared growth”, the key to which was a generalized socioeconomic upturn and the 
redistribution of land, human capital and well-paid jobs, while public investment in primary health care was fairly 
low. In the Latin American countries, by contrast, the welfare state was the predominant model. Governments 
provided direct public health services, greatly expanding primary health care coverage for the poor, even within a 
context of sharp and persistent social inequalities and high levels of poverty. 
In the early twentieth century, Costa Rica and Chile had extremely high rates of child mortality, of at least 
250 per thousand. In the 1940s these rates began to decline steadily, concomitantly with the implementation of 
social security and health schemes. Even so, both countries (especially Chile) continued to display surprisingly 
high rates until the 1960s. From then on, thanks to the extension of social security and primary health care to 
almost the entire population, the rate decreased rapidly. In Costa Rica a landmark came in 1973 with the creation 
of the rural health programme, which covered over 600,000 people living in small communities. In Chile, the 
consolidation of a broad network under the auspices of the National Health Service and the strengthening of 
mother and child programmes helped to reduce child mortality even in the context of very trying socioeconomic 
circumstances, such as the recessions of 1972-1976 and 1982-1984. In both countries the training of specialized 
human resources for the health sector was a key factor. In addition to the much wider supply of professionals and 
technicians, incentives were offered to work in rural areas and isolated communities, which directly benefited 
most of the inhabitants. 
The examples of Chile and Costa Rica show that perseverance with the right policies can bring 
worthwhile achievements in human development, even when it is necessary to contend with low economic 
growth, sharp inequities in income distribution and high levels of poverty. 
 
Source: J. McGuire, “Social policy and mortality decline in East Asia and Latin America”, World Development, 
vol. 29, No. 10, 2001. 
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Box V.2 
PREVENTING AIDS IN THE REGION 
 
In 1994, the Brazilian Health Ministry’s National Programme for Sexually Transmittable Diseases and Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome launched Project SIDA (AIDS) I, within the framework of an agreement between the 
Brazilian government and the World Bank (Cohen and others, 2001). In the area of prevention, the Programme targets 
broad specific population groups, including the rural population, workers, homosexuals, convicts, indigenous people, 
women, young people, children and users of injectable drugs. Thanks to the programme, these groups have 
developed a greater awareness of the illness and its modes of transmission. Safe sex practices have also been widely 
introduced, with a high rate of condom use recorded among both heterosexuals and homosexuals. The programme 
has been crucial to slowing the rapid expansion of the disease observed among young Brazilians in the early 1990s. 
In Mexico, the National Centre for the Prevention and Control of HIV/AIDS (CENSIDA), which reports to 
the Ministry of Health, undertakes intensive dissemination of information and educational material about AIDS and 
the diagnosis of HIV. A priority area of action is promoting the use of condoms, with explanation of their proper use, 
as a means to avoid infection. Although sexual transmission continues to be the main cause of infection, 
transmission between male partners has declined sharply (in the mid-1980s over 90% of transmissions were between 
male partners, but by 1999 this figure had dropped to almost 50%). Meanwhile, transmission between heterosexual 
partners has increased as a proportion of the total. Major efforts to ensure the safety of blood transfusions have 
achieved a decrease in transmissions of HIV via this channel from 15% in 1990 to just 0.02% in 2000. Lastly, thanks to 
free health care for pregnant women, the incidence of the disease among this group has been reduced to a very low 
level, thus avoiding transmission to unborn children, which is the leading cause of infection among children under 
the age of 15. 
In Chile, the National AIDS Commission (CONASIDA) was created in 1990 to coordinate the AIDS 
Prevention and Control Programme. CONASIDA is responsible for a system of epidemiological monitoring of the 
disease and carries out research, implements direct measures and acts as a coordinating agency for the various actors 
involved in helping to prevent contagion. Epidemiological monitoring is conducted by means of both passive and 
active mechanisms (passive ones include obligatory notification of cases of AIDS and non-symptomatic HIV, while 
active control consists of studies on HIV sero-prevalence using sentinel centre methods). At the end of 2001, the 
Law on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus was enacted along with fiscal benefits in case of catastrophic illness, as a 
means to strengthen prevention, ensure the control and dignified treatment of the illness and avoid social and labour 
discrimination against infected individuals. CONASIDA carries out prevention work in society —information and 
awareness-raising campaigns in the media and through the formal education system— among specific groups and 
conducts education and training targeting more exposed groups, such as those working in the sex trade, men who 
have homosexual partners and the penal community, as well as young people and housewives. It also carries out 
prevention work on an individual basis, providing support to interested parties through experts working in sexually 
transmitted disease centres and public health centres throughout the country, and free and confidential telephone 
counselling. 
 
Source: Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) (www.unaids.org), 2001. Ernesto Cohen and 
others, Gestión de programas sociales en América Latina: análisis de casos; Vol. II: el Programa Nacional 
de Enfermedades Sexualmente transmisibles (DST) y Síndrome de Inmumodeficiencia Adquirida (SIDA) de 
Brasil, serie Políticas sociales, No 46 (LC/L.1470/Add.1-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2001. United Nations publication, Sales No S.01.II.G.37; National Centre 
for the Prevention and Control of HIV/AIDS (CENSIDA) (www.ssa.gob.mx/conasida/), 2001; National 







PROFAMILIA: A KEY PLAYER IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF FAMILY PLANNING  
AND SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE IN COLOMBIA 
 
The Colombian Association for Family Welfare (PROFAMILIA), a private non-profit institution established in 1965, 
provides programmes of family planning and sexual and reproductive health that target especially the most 
underprivileged groups of the population. By charging modest fees and broadening the range of services it offers, 
and thanks to an extensive network of institutional donors, it has been able to become 90% self-financing. 
 PROFAMILIA has played an important role in the rapid decline in fertility recorded in Colombia since the 
mid-1960s. It makes a contribution in a wide range of fields: sexual and reproductive health care services for the care 
of the body and prevention of disease; provision of a number of family planning alternatives for couples to support 
their decisions on the number and spacing of children; education targeting adolescents of both sexes, to raise 
awareness of the need to avoid unwanted pregnancy; legal advice on sexual and reproductive rights; training of 
public and private sector personnel in the implementation of the institution’s different programmes; generation of 
scientific information on population, family planning and sexual and reproductive health; and distribution of various 
types of contraceptives and associated products. 
 PROFAMILIA now has 35 centres providing contraceptive and medical services. These account for over 
70% of all family planning services in Colombia today. Its diversified programmes reach many different types of 
people; its mobile health care centres bring services to remote, largely rural areas. In these areas and in marginalized 
urban areas a community system of contraceptive distribution is run through local leaders. PROFAMILIA has 
conducted major programmes of voluntary sterilization for women and has two clinics devoted exclusively to the 
performance of male vasectomies and other sexual and reproductive health services. With regard to the prevention of 
AIDS, the organization’s programmes, consisting of information and distribution of condoms, have been directed at 





From the observations made here, it may be concluded that there is a clear winner in the classic 
rivalry between approaches that reduce sociodemographic risks through structural social change sand 
those that afford priority to delineated and specific action to remove them.6 Undeniable evidence exists 
that sociodemographic risks can be reduced without significant concomitant socioeconomic development. 
The debate, however, continues unabated. In the view of a number of authors, the evidence fails to reveal 
a causal link between explicit sociodemographic policies and the profound demographic change caused by 
the rapid advance of the demographic transition (see box V.4).7 Others argue that prevention is the net 
effect of macroeconomic or macrosocial policies and that social —including sociodemographic— policies 
must therefore focus on strengthening response capacity and adaptability.8 There is a third position, 
however, between the unshakeable upholders of preventive action and authors who see its efficiency as 
relative or doubtful. This group favours the “qualification” of such measures through the identification of 
                                                 
6 This debate reached a high point at the United Nations World Population Conference, which was held in 
Bucharest in 1974. On that occasion, those who argued that development is the best means to prevent high fertility 
(“development as a contraceptive”) clashed with those in favour of investing in birth control (as “an obstacle to 
development”) as an option that would have highly positive effects in the long term. 
7 “Overall, the influence of explicit policies on fertility reduction has been negligible by comparison to the 
unplanned and unintended effects of a variety of public and private initiatives” (Martine, 1996, p. 72). 
8 “Risk reduction covers macroeconomic management, regulations and institutional development policies 
that help prevent crises from occurring” (Hicks and Wodon, 2001, p. 96); i.e., prevention is essentially a matter for 
macroeconomic policy. 
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factors that may contribute to their success. Preventive measures with regard to the risks involved in 
transitional lag, therefore, night be aided by synergies with technological advances; the expansion of 
knowledge regarding the risks and their determining factors; the significance of profound socioeconomic 




FERTILITY DECLINE IN BRAZIL: AN UNINTENDED CHANGE 
 
Brazil’s rapid fertility decline occurred during a period of far-reaching social change, which encompassed times of 
both rapid economic growth and economic downswings. Government-induced modernization, begun in the 1950s and 
intensified during the 1960s, changed the locus of economic activity, accelerated rural-urban migration, promoted the 
development of a consumer society and gave a more powerful role to the media, whose messages helped to bring 
about a change in attitude in favour of smaller families. As a result of these changes, the costs of rearing children 
increased, and family-size preferences rapidly declined. 
Many of the institutional changes of the 1960s, which were made by a military regime seeking to modernize 
the county in a short space of time, had collateral effects on both people’s reasons for controlling fertility and their 
ability to do so. In general, these outcomes increased social pressure to have fewer offspring, but a combination of 
measures on the part of a number of social actors limited the practical availability of modern contraceptive methods, 
which meant that abortion and sterilization became the most common methods of fertility control. 
Explicit policies have had a negligible influence on fertility reduction in comparison with the wave of 
unplanned effects of a variety of public and private initiatives. In fact, the Brazilian government has never had a 
policy explicitly geared towards reducing population growth. 
The Brazilian experience is of great significance for a critical review of research and policies in this domain. It 
clearly demonstrates that fertility decline does not require large-scale family planing programmes. It also suggests 
that an unassisted or “market based” fertility reduction, whereby women use whatever methods are available, can 
have serious negative implications for their health, as reflected in high abortion and female sterilization rates. 
 
Source: G. Martine, “Brazil’s fertility decline, 1965-1995: a fresh look at key factors”, Population and Development 
Review, vol. 22, No. 1, 1996. 
 
 
 There can be no doubt that technological advances —in medicine, techniques and knowledge— 
have played a key role in the prevention of mortality and in birth control. Many of these advances were 
developed outside the region, which benefited from them through mass dissemination (of knowledge and 
techniques) or imported them. Neither can there be any doubt about the crucial role of a number of actors 
who have helped to enhance the prevention of mortality and high fertility. This has been a matter not only 
of political will and incorporation of technical progress, but of encouraging the impressive increase in 
research and in the stock of knowledge on both phenomena, which have made for better founded and, 
therefore, more efficient measures. 
 
Fertility and mortality declines are not only mutually reinforcing, but have been driven by 
socioeconomic changes of a structural nature (see figure V.1; IDB, 2000b; Chackiel and Schkolnik, 1998; 
CELADE/IDB, 1996; CELADE, 1996; Kirk, 1996; Bajraj and Chackiel, 1995; Vallin, 1994; Tabah, 1989, 
World Bank, 1984). These structural changes —urbanization, the expansion of physical and symbolic 
connectivity (which is very important in access to health care and the construction of a preventive health 
culture) and the gradual process of emancipation of women, among others— are to some extent 




Lastly, at the risk of stating the obvious, the risks of high mortality and fertility share a common 
feature that is essential for the success of preventive policies: both are preventable. High mortality, 
especially in childhood, is caused by a number of pathological infections which can readily be controlled 
with low-cost measures (see box V.5). In turn, measures to prevent high fertility are usually required 
where there is an unmet family planning need; if there is no such need, then the first objective of fertility 
reduction measures must be to dispense with the material, institutional and symbolic motives underlying 


























3. Contemporary challenges to the prevention of sociodemographic risks 
 
As may be deduced from the foregoing discussion, the prevention of risks associated with transitional lag 
is both feasible and a good policy option. Although prevention is also viable for most other risks, 
experience shows that such measures involve logical, normative or practical difficulties. Problems of logic 
arise when risks grow out of the reduction of other risks, or those which appear to be inevitable in the long 
term, such as ageing. Normative complications arise when risks derive from the exercise of individual 
rights —such as the spatial mobility of the population— making preventive measures unadvisable (see box 
V.6).9 Practical difficulties arise in the case of risks that can and should be prevented, but whose 
                                                 
9 Although the measures in question touch on issues that are a matter of individual rights, this is not reason 
enough to refrain from taking them, as has been demonstrated by successful fertility reduction programmes in the 
region. Prevention is of limited scope with regard to some risks, however, such as the risks inherent in opportunities 
Box V.5 
PREVENTING CHILD MORTALITY: MAKING THE MOST OF THE FACILITIES 
 
Mortality in children under one year old is often caused by afflictions that can readily be controlled with low-cost 
measures. Three out of every four deaths occurring before one year of age are caused either by dehydration 
resulting from diarrhoea or by an acute respiratory infection. A sachet of rehydration salts costs US$ 0.08 and 
respiratory infections can be avoided with adequate nourishment and access to basic medical care. Together with 
good pre- and post-natal care, which are also inexpensive, these measures would greatly reduce the number of 
preventable child deaths. 
Other low-cost investments which would significantly improve the quality of life of newborns, their 
mothers and families are: (i) Three capsules of vitamin A, which are sufficient to protect a child for one year from 
blindness and other health problems caused by vitamin A deficiency, US$ 0.07; (ii) one fetal stethoscope for 
carrying out basic checks on pregnant women, US$ 1.23; (iii) one plastic latrine with drainpipe to provide basic 
sanitation for one family and thus eliminate a major source of infection, US$ 5; (iv) inputs required 
—syringes and needles, refrigeration facilities, health personnel— to immunize a child against the six main 
childhood diseases, US$ 15 average; (v) one thermally insulated container for keeping 500 doses of vaccines 
cool, US$ 15.50; and (vi) one hand-operated pump, piping and fittings for a well to provide 50 families with 
drinking water, US$ 150. 
 
Source: ECLAC, 2001a. 
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complexities often nullify efforts deployed to prevent them, adolescent fertility being an example. Despite 
their significance, these obstacles in no way render preventive programmes and measures unprofitable, 
however. The cases outlined below show that prevention is an essentia l tool, albeit one that requires to be 







































                                                                                                                                                             
and those contained in individual, household and collective strategies —such as international migration— and those 
that may be the collateral effects of sociocultural modernization, such as an increase in consensual unions and 
divorce. 
Box V.6 
THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT BETWEEN AND WITHIN COUNTRIES 
 
Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that: (a) Everyone has the right to freedom of 
movement and residence within the borders of each State; and (b) Everyone has the right to leave any country, 
including his own, and to return to his country. 
 Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that: (a) Everyone lawfully 
within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to 
choose his residence; (b) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own; (c) The above-
mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to 
protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, 
and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant; and (d) No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of the right to enter his own country. 
  The first aspect of the right to freedom of movement is the freedom to reside in the territory of a State. 
This applies to everyone, regardless of nationality. However, it extends only to individuals  residing legally in the 
territory of a particular State, which means that it does not extend to undocumented migrants or migrant workers 
in an irregular situation. 
The second aspect of the right to freedom of movement is the right to leave any country, including 
one’s own. This is also applicable to everyone with no distinction whatsoever. The United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights has sustained that although the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not 
stipulate the right to enter any country, apart from one’s own, the right to leave and return should be interpreted 
in a broad manner. This right has therefore translated into the right to travel, of which access to the requisite 
travel documents may be considered an integral part. The main limitation on the right to freedom of movement is 
that, according to international law, it does not imply the right to enter the territory of another country. In fact, 
one of the most widely recognized principles of the sovereignty of States is the right to establish the conditions 
of entry to their territory. 
The third aspect is the right to enter one’s own country. The interpretation of this provision has been 
lengthily debated over such issues as whether nationality is a requirement. The exercis e of this right has also 
proven problematic in the absence of the requisite documentation or travel identification. 
It has also been argued that the right to freedom of movement necessarily implies the right not to move 
or not to be displaced. International and internal armed conflicts, civil wars and the implementation of 
discriminatory domestic policies can cause displacement and thus infringe the right to the freedom of movement, 
not only because the displaced invariably find their movements restricted (when for example, they are confined in 
camps or resettlement villages), but also because they cannot exercise their right to return to their country of 
origin or original area of residence. The right of people to live in peace, in their homes, land and countries was 
also reaffirmed by the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities at its forty-
eighth session, in resolution 1996/9. 
 
Source: R. Perruchoud, “Legal Standards for the protection of Migrant Workers”, presented at the Symposium, 
on International Migration in the Americas, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
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(a) Prevention and adolescent pregnancy 
 
Prevention of early reproduction can take the form of structural, specific or mixed strategies. 
Structural strategies are based on the principle that adolescent fertility arises from a lack of social and 
cultural options that “pushes” men and women into early parenthood. Structural prevention policies 
therefore aim to broaden the range of opportunities, in particular for adolescents. Specific interventions, by 
contrast, aim to have a direct impact on the immediate determinants of early fertility (Davis and Blake, 
1956) and are based on the supposition that the decision to postpone parenthood requires the tools to do so 
—knowledge, training and access to contraceptive methods— and incentives to delay the beginning of 
sexual activity (or marriage, if for cultural reasons sexual activity takes place essentially within marriage). 
Although a combination of structural and specific preventive policies would seem the best option, the need 
for a rapid and decisive means to prevent the risk tends to lead to a predominance of specific measures. 
When it comes to prevention, there is no single best approach, but a number of options whose applicability 
depends on the context, the political tendency of governments and the specific psychosocial features of 
adolescent men and women. 
 
 The contextual factors underlying adolescent fertility (ECLAC, 2001a) may reflect cultural 
patterns that encourage the trio of initiations (sexual, nuptial and reproductive) to take place early. 
Structural and specific measures come up against symbolic barriers that make it difficult to offer life 
options which discourage early union and pregnancy. Where adolescent fertility is part of a phenomenon 
of distorted sexual and reproductive modernity, however, prevention may take the form of special 
awareness-raising campaigns and education (at school, in health centres and in the media) to promote 
responsible reproductive behaviour. It may also translate into programmes that act on the immediate 
determinants of adolescent fertility, by broadening access to contraceptives or attempting to delay sexual 
initiation. Such measures should obviously treat adolescents as potentially sexually active individuals. 
 
Apart from the differences between sociocultural contexts —which are largely a reflection of 
how modern or traditional they are— preventive measures in the area of adolescent fertility must be 
adapted to the specific features of counties and regions. For example, in Central America and the 
Caribbean there is a pattern of early formation of unions, most of them informal (Guzmán and others, 
2001), which translates into high rates of adolescent fertility outside marriage, but within the framework of 
unions that can become permanent. There are two countries, however, that display major contrasts. One is 
Haiti, which has high total fertility and a low rate of contraceptive use in all age groups, but low adolescent 
fertility.10 In Jamaica, by contrast, total fertility is low but adolescent fertility is high, which is attributable to 
a pattern of early sexual initiation and early union.11 Another example of cultural specificities are the 
                                                 
10 In the mid-1990s, just 3.6% of Haitian adolescent girls used some method of contraception (in Brazil the 
figure was 15%); among those in some form of union 10.7% used contraception and among those not in unions but 
sexually active, 23% (in Brazil the figures were 54% and 66%, respectively). In adolescent boys, 16.5% of the total and 
36% of those not in unions but sexually active used some form of contraception (in Brazil, 33% and 73%, 
respectively). (Guzmán and others, 2001). Data from the Population and Health Survey of 1994/1995 indicated that the 
rate of adolescent fertility in Haiti was 70 per thousand in the quinquennium 1995-2000 (in Brazil this figure was 86.3 
per thousand) and only 11% of adolescent girls were mothers. 
11 According to a survey conducted in 1997 by the Caribbean Documentation Centre, adolescent fertility in 
Jamaica was 112 per thousand, and 29% of women in the 25-29 cohort at the time of the survey had become mothers 
before the age of 18. Of these women, 63% had had sexual intercourse before the age of 18, and 74% of men aged 15-
19 already had sexual experience. 
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indigenous communities in the altiplano of Bolivia and Peru, where total fertility is high and the use of 
contraceptive generally low, although adolescent fertility tends to be low, due to a pattern of relatively late 
union. In each case, policies must consider —and use, if necessary— the values, norms and traditions that 
encourage behaviour patterns. 
 
The prevention of adolescent fertility also depends on the political orientation of governments. 
Direct interventions regarding the immediate determinants may aim to expand information and knowledge 
about contraceptive methods and access to them, or to delay the onset of sexual relations. Although it is 
theoretically valid to pursue both goals at the same time, in practice they tend to pull in different directions, 
since their political and ideological implications tend to be opposed.12 In any case, the basic principle 
applicable to adolescents is no different from the principles applicable to women in general, in other words 
to have access to the means to avoid unwanted pregnancies. 
 
The specific psycho-social features of adolescent boys and girls play a key role in the definition of 
measures of fertility prevention in this group. Because of their high degree of dependency on their parents 
or families and because they are going through a complex (and sometimes erratic) period of life, 
adolescents tend to be resistant to programmes of sexual and reproductive health and responsible 
parenthood designed with adults in mind. Although increased use of contraceptives reduces the risk of 
fertility in women in general, its rate of success is much lower in adolescents (see table V.1). This is due 
both to technical reasons —since having the means at hand is not necessarily equivalent to using them 
properly— and to psycho-social reasons that form part of the characteristics of this age group, such as 
emotional inexperience and instability and difficulties in conducting reflective negotiations with a partner 
(Guzmán and others, 2001, Fischhoff, Nightingale and Iannota, 2001; ECLAC 2000e and 1998). 
 
Table V.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): MODEL OF AGGREGATE RATIO 
OF ADOLESCENT TO TOTAL FERTILITY AND PREVALENCE OF 
MODERN CONTRACEPTIVE USE AMONG ADOLESCENTS AND WOMEN OF  





Parameters and proofs relevant to the 
regression 
1980s 1990s 1980s 1990s 
Constant (intercept) 114.2 100.6 5.64 5.78 
x coefficient -0.53 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 
Standard error for x 0.61 0.40 0.01 0.01 
t statistic for x -0.86 -0.01 -3.93 -5.56 
Probability of error when the null hypothesis is 
rejected 
40% 91%  0.2%     0.01% 
Percentage of the variation in fertility explained 









Source: Authors’ calculations using data from specialized surveys conducted by Demographic and Health Surveys 
and surveys conducted by the Caribbean Documentation Centre. 
                                                 
12 The decision to make modern contraceptive methods universally available to adolescents could be 
interpreted as an incentive for early sexual initiation. By contrast, the denial of access to contraception in order to 
discourage sexual initiation in adolescence (which would contravene an established right) could increase fertility 
(especially unwanted fertility) and abortion rates among adolescent girls. 
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a  Cross-sectional regressions. Estimates calculated by ordinary  least squares. Observations correspond to the 
following countries: Belize (1991); Bolivia (1989 and 1999); Brazil (1986 and 1996); Colombia (1986 and 2000); Costa 
Rica (1986 and 1993); Ecuador (1987 and 1999); El Salvador (1985 and 1998); Guatemala (1987 and 1998/1999); Haiti 
(1994/1995); Honduras (1996); Jamaica (1997); Mexico (1987); Nicaragua (1992/1993 and 1997); Paraguay (1990 and 
1998); Peru (1986 and 1996); Dominican Republic (1986 and 1996); and Trinidad and Tobago (1987). 
 
Jamaica stands out for high rates of adolescent fertility observed alongside high indexes of 
contraceptive use, even among adolescents and even, moreover, during the first sexual encounter 
(Guzmán and others, 2001) (see figure V.1). It certainly may not be inferred from this observation, 
however, that widespread availability of contraceptives among adolescents is ineffective or 
counterproductive. The experience of European countries has shown that the proper use of contraceptives 
is both feasible and associated with low levels of adolescent fertility. Public intervention in the area of 
sexual and reproductive health among adolescents does, however, require special programmes (health, 
education, affective development) that take into account the key aspects that influence their sexual and 




LATIN AMERICA, THE CARIBBEAN AND SPAIN: PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN AGED 15 TO 24 
YEARS WHO USED MODERN CONTRACEPTIVES IN THEIR  

















Source:  Fertility and Family Survey (FFS) for Spain; for the Latin American countries: Paraguay Centre for 
Population Studies (CEPEP), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Center for 
Disease Control (CDC) (1999), National Survey of Maternal and Child Health: 1998; ENSMI-98. Final report, 
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In theory, population ageing can be prevented by measures that modify its direct demographic 
causes. Since the option of raising adult mortality is excluded, policies should seek to increase fertility or to 
achieve a “rejuvenating” migratory balance. This can be achieved through various combinations of net 
migration levels by age (United Nations, 2001). But what seems feasible in theory has proven to be not 
only extremely complex in practice, but also insufficient for redressing maturing situations. 
 
The experience of several European countries shows that initiatives taken to promote fertility are 
generally unsuccessful (Teitelbaum, 2000). Indeed, actions of this type tend to have the opposite effect to 
the dominant trend in the region —which is to increase birth control— and run counter to the logic implicit 
in most public policies and long-term social processes, which tend to favour a decline in fertility. The sharp 
increase in the older population is already a reality in many countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
since it is the result of the intense demographic growth in the past and the increase in life expectancy at 
60. In short, a possible increase in fertility could attenuate the growing proportion of older adults in the 
population, but would not manage to contain the enormous social pressures generated by its expansion in 
absolute terms. 
 
On the other hand, migration can be a preventive (or adaptive) mechanism in dealing with ageing. In 
fact, in some countries, age selectivity of international migration has helped to counterbalance ageing at 
least temporarily, although there is consensus that it is not a solution for this process (United Nations, 
2001; Lesthaeghe, 2001). More doubtful still is whether replacement migration can be used to prevent 
ageing in Latin America and the Caribbean, since the region is currently a net exporter of young people 
(ECLAC, 2002; ECLAC, 2000e and 2000f; Villa and Martínez, 2001) and does not hold much appeal for 
persons from other latitudes. For its part, the option of promoting emigration of older persons would call for 
very powerful direct support, even from the potential destination countries, since, on the contrary, only 
persons with the resources to leave would do so. Moreover, some countries, especially the Caribbean, 
have been recording a return migration of former emigrants, who have now reached retirement age. 
 
To sum up, indications are that policies for coping with the risk of population ageing must be centred 
more on strengthening the response capacity and adaptation skills than on prevention. Nevertheless, 
prevention can be fundamental for postponing or attenuating some adverse effects of the process. This is 
especially relevant in the case of individual ageing, of which the most negative effects are physiological 
deterioration, socio-economic dependency and the absence of a well-defined role. To counterbalance 
these effects, policies for response or active adjustment should be designed and implemented; such an 
approach would be somewhat short-sighted, however, since the promotion of healthy life styles, routine 
health checks, building self-identity (self-esteem) and other similar actions significantly reduce some of the 
sources of psycho-physiological deterioration (see box V.7). These preventive measures can become 
adaptive responses to ageing when it is already further advanced. 
 
Box V.7 
PRINCIPLES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY FOR OLDER PERSONS 
 
Ageing is a universal phenomenon. 
 Ageing is part of life and, as such, calls for an intergenerational approach directed towards promoting health 
throughout the life cycle. 
 The chronic disability associated with old age can be prevented or delayed. Prevention is not only a health 
concern, but also has social, economic and environmental ingredients. 
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 Ageing is a development issue. The social and economic integration of older persons is essential for 
population development. A productive old age is a human resource. 
 Older persons participate in the development of healthy communities or municipalities, which ensure their 
proper nutrition, promote “user-friendly” housing, provide opportunities for continuing education, seek alternative 
sources of paid labour or stimulate the development of micro-businesses to support self-sufficiency of older persons, 
foster artistic and cultural expression, seek access on an equitable basis to primary care services and provide 
opportunities for the creation of positive and productive roles for the older population. 
 
Source: Division of Health Promotion and Protection/Pan-American Health Organization/World Health Organization 
(HPP/PAHO/WHO), 1999. 
 
(c) Prevention and ambiguous sociodemographic risks 
 
As with other sociodemographic risks, international migration and family instability can be 
prevented, but only in a limited way and with due precautions. Since, in such cases, reference is made to 
behaviour, actions may be dissuasive (for example, institutional barriers or socioeconomic deterrents), 
without it being necessary to proscribe certain types of behaviour. One example of this is the proposal for 
making the grounds for divorce stricter (Instituto Libertad y Desarrollo, 2001, p. 3), or that of promoting 
levels of institutional mediation (such as specialized advisory services for couples considering divorce or 
persons wishing to emigrate), which would come into play before a final decision is made. In the same 
vein, there could be specific incentives for promoting alternatives to high-risk conduct (such as tax 
regulations that encourage legal marriages instead of informal unions) and specific penalties (such as red 
tape for the recognition of social security contributions accrued abroad). Dissuasion can also be centred on 
symbolic, cultural and psycho-social issues during early stages of life (such as efforts that seek to instil 
values in children and reflexive attitudes in the face of particular conducts). 
 
Nevertheless, the application of these dissuasive measures implies controversial biases: Why 
should emigrants be penalized? Why discriminate against consensual unions? Moreover, measures of this 
kind can stigmatize some persons (for example, divorced persons), whose behaviour merely reflects the 
exercise of universally recognized rights or the solution to a problem for which there may have been no 
other solution. Lastly, these actions may be sterile if one does not recognize the sense of the macrosocial 
processes underway, many of which lead to the spread of such risks.13 
 
Apart from dissuasive action, which focuses directly on risks, more structural initiatives directed at 
weakening the root causes may also be considered. This is, undoubtedly, the option most in keeping with 
international agreements; for example, the Programme of Action adopted at the International Conference 
on Population and Development states that: “Governments of countries of origin and of countries of 
destination should seek to make the option of remaining in one's country viable for all people” (United 
Nations, 1995, p. 56); this would reduce emigration based on “push factors” in the home country, which is 
usually the most insecure form. Underlying this approach is an implicit model of causal relationships 
between risks and their determining factors, essentially material ones: emigration is associated with labour 
market rigidities and social upheavals in the countries of origin; consensual unions seem to be a basic part 
                                                 
13 Although this does seem to be the case for divorce, the most recent figures recorded in some European 
countries show zero increase in the probability of this outcome, which suggests that its relative frequency has limits. 




of social exclusion and mistrust in the State; divorces seem to be the result of economic constraints and 
lack of public support for harmonizing family life and individual aspirations. Undeniably, there is a need for 
policies to cope with the material determinants of risks, but even if the results were successful, it would 
still be necessary to address the underlying symbolic and cultural factors. Historically, action aimed at 
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D. INITIATIVES AIMED AT STRENGTHENING THE RESPONSE CAPACITY 
 
 
Various types of action may be adopted to strengthen the capacity of units of reference to respond to 
adversities that are the outcome of sociodemographic risks. One of these is to enhance these units’ 
capacity to forecast risks and take prompt action to avoid the spread or intensification of their adverse 
effects. Another line of action is to train units of reference to defend themselves and react to negative 
outcomes by increasing and updating their assets and to promote skills for designing and implementing 
appropriate strategies. A third type of initiative could be directed towards alleviating the effects of the 
materialization of risks by signing agreements and establishing institutional linkages. Units of reference also 
need to be insured against the occurrence of specific risks and to establish credit mechanisms to face up 
to them. Lastly, a central component of the efforts taken to strengthen the response capacity is to enhance 
the organization and group action of units of reference. 
 
 
1. Anticipating adversities 
 
Policies aimed at anticipating risks and their effects hinge on the generation and accumulation of 
knowledge and information. Thus, communities can identify the emergence or intensification of a risk at an 
early stage to the extent that they dispose of a body of technical staff —and reliable sources of 
information and appropriate systems of indicators— specialized in the follow-up of sociodemographic 
trends; such knowledge can be used to prepare probability scenarios and to develop other response or 
adaptation mechanisms. That is, a community’s forecasting capacity is key, since many sociodemographic 
risks operate at an aggregate level and develop over long periods of time.14 While these risks are not 
evident until after they have materialized, —which means that they cannot be prevented— projecting their 
course of development will help to increase the awareness of decision-makers and sectoral specialists as 
to what may be expected in the future. Demographic ageing and cohort fluctuations are examples of risks 
whose adverse consequences can be attenuated through appropriate forecasting and this can be used to 
develop other types of response; in this respect, sectoral policies, whose sensitivity to the demographic 
dynamic has been underscored in recent years, have a crucial role to play (IDB, 2000a and 2000b; 
CELADE/IDB, 1996; CELADE, 1996). 
 
Early identification is also suitable for attenuating the adverse repercussions of risks for individuals 
and households. With respect to health and mortality, for example, the danger of many diseases is a direct 
function of their phase of development, so that a timely diagnosis increases the prospects of success in 
treatment and, consequently, reduces the financial and psychological costs for households and 
communities. The capacity for early action is essential in the case of risks relating to individual decisions, 
since this approach is taken in anticipation of the event and acts as a preventive mechanism.15 Thus, for 
example, emigrants who are aware of their rights and of the existence of support networks and who have 
                                                 
14 Some countries in the region have set up mechanisms for generating a demographic culture (CONAPO, 
1995. p. 55). 
15 This refers to healthy lifestyles and prophylactic practices of all kinds. The anticipation of the effects of 
certain conducts can serve to avoid the materialization of risk (and can be aimed, for example, at preventing unwanted 
fertility or adolescent fertility). 
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access to information on the real options offered by the country of destination will have more resources 
for dealing with the risks of discrimination, exclusion and violation of their rights. 
 
2. Preparing actors  
 
Another way of strengthening the response capacity of actors is to prepare them to react to adversities to 
which they may be susceptible and this can be achieved by increasing the assets of communities, 
households and persons, as well as by enhancing their skills for designing strategies and putting them into 
practice. Social policies play a central role in this exercise to the extent that they provide appropriate 
assets,. Perhaps the best example is that of education policies: education that provides wide coverage, is of 
a high standard and that is relevant and comprehensive is a solid foundation for achieving successful, 
productive integration and a satisfactory level of income. That is to say, education enables students to 
secure assets that are a powerful defence against the material adversities entailed by the materialization of 
social risks of any type and sociodemographic risks in particular. Such assets can also reduce (or, in some 
cases, cancel out) the pressures, exigencies and material difficulties caused by extended families, divorce 
or teenage pregnancy. In particular, building up financial reserves is one of the most obvious ways in 
which individuals can prepare for adverse events. Education also provides symbolic assets which expand 
one’s understanding of the world and promote the establishment of symmetrical relationships with others;16 
thus, a suitable education for migrants provides them with information, knowledge, arguments and codes 
for defending themselves against the possibility of discrimination in their place of destination. 
 
Cross-cutting policies, such as those that promote the advancement of the status of women in 
communities and households and seek to reduce gender imbalances, have a tremendous impact on the 
preparation for addressing sociodemographic risks. This is due to the fact that, for predominantly cultural 
reasons, women are those who suffer the harshest adversities; by changing their weak sociocultural 
situation one can enhance their response capacity. This is particularly valid given the socio-economic 
adversities associated with situations of marital breakdown, since because of sociocultural constraints, 
women have less means and fewer supports for coping with domestic life or employment without a 
partner. 
 
There are also specific initiatives whose purpose is to prepare communities, households and 
individuals to cope with adverse sociodemographic occurrences. The psychosocial support provided to 
pregnant teenagers helps them to mature and to acquire the knowledge needed for raising children. The 
preparation of potential international migrants by providing them with important information and by 
promoting contacts with networks that support their integration defends them against abuse, discrimination 
or xenophobia in destination societies. Investment in environmental protection infrastructure to 
communities located in zones exposed to environmental disasters enhances their resistance. 
 
 
3. Mitigating the consequences of adversities 
 
Since social and, hence, sociodemographic risks can scarcely be eradicated completely, palliative 
measures are invariably necessary when such risks materialize; even if the preventive action were highly 
                                                 
16 Thus, education policies —and, in general, social policies based on promoting citizenship rather than on a 
welfare approach— have an enabling effect which is of crucial importance for prevention and active adjustment. 
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efficient, there would always be communities, households and persons who face risk and adversity. In any 
event, the palliative action must be designed in such a way that is not construed as condoning the 
materialization of preventable risks (or moral hazard), since this would imply reversing the order of 
priorities of the policies, diminish individual responsibility and entail avoidable expenses. This does not 
mean that persons, households and communities who have placed themselves at risk as a result of 
inappropriate conduct or a wrong decision, should be abandoned to their fate. Apart from the ethical and 
political considerations that may be put forward against such an orthodox approach, the fact that 
practically all palliative programmes at the sociodemographic level contemplate only partial compensation 
of the adverse conditions drastically reduces the probability that their application may be taken as an 
incentive for high-risk behaviour. 
 
Within the wide range of palliative programmes, non-contributory transfers (in cash or kind), 
which are granted to older persons, mothers with young children, widows, displaced persons and 
households in remote areas, are examples of measures that seek to moderate sociodemographic problems 
or exigencies, such as ageing, high fertility, forced migration and location in inhospitable areas. Support, 
training and subsidy programmes conducted in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica and other countries for female 
heads of household are palliative measures.17 Thus, the institutional systems for adoption and care of 
abandoned or abused children seek to reduce the consequences of unwanted pregnancy or family 
dysfunction. The support initiatives provided to patients with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) 
attest to the relevance of palliative as well as preventive action.18 
 
While prevention is the first policy option for addressing the risk of teenage pregnancy, support 
provided by countries to adolescent mothers is a palliative measure that has proven indispensable for 
overcoming the most severe adversities. Such support comes from various sources (public, private-sector, 
non-governmental agencies) and is geared towards different objectives, but, almost systematically, seeks 
to enable girls to pursue their schooling, to enhance their parenting skills and to benefit their children (see 
box V.8). These programmes arise not only from the need to respond to the exigencies of pregnancy and 
child-rearing, but also from the need to counteract the institutional and cultural regulations which penalize 
pregnant teenagers and adolescent mothers twice. The fact that most programmes are geared towards 
reinforcing motherhood/fatherhood and that —unlike the systems of adoption or institutional care— their 
objective does not imply transferring responsibility for bringing up the child, the probability of moral hazard 
is also reduced. 
 
                                                 
17 Most of these programmes target women of reproductive age who, because of gender bias, must assume 
responsibility for raising their sons and daughters often from a broken union. 
18 For example, the National Programme on Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Acquired Immunodeficiency 
Syndrome (AIDS) of Brazil, in addition to its preventive components comprises activities for reducing morbidity and 
mortality and for improving the quality of life of infected persons; this helps to delay the onset of the disease or 
prolong life, as well as to lend dignity to their condition by providing them with appropriate medical attention and by 
taking steps to create awareness of the rights of those affected in order to avoid discrimination against them; since 
1996, carriers of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and AIDS sufferers have been granted universal, free access to 
the required drugs and to comprehensive support services with multidisciplinary professional teams (Cohen and 
others, 2001). In other countries, while laws have been enacted to expand coverage of the effective treatment of AIDS 
(double and triple antiretroviral treatment), it is only assured to specific groups of the population, such as children 
and pregnant women; estimates for Chile suggest that 80% of infected persons registered under the public health 






Socio-demographic vulnerability: old and new risks for communities… 63 
 
Box V.8 
SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR PREGNANT ADOLESCENTS AND ADOLESCENT MOTHERS: 
SOME REGIONAL EXPERIENCES 
 
 
The Building Opportunities Programme developed by the National Women’s Institute (INAMU) of Costa Rica is 
intended for adolescent mothers or pregnant teenagers or those socially at risk. It includes support workshops for 
living (in which more than 4,000 girls have participated) and, in conjunction with other public entities, supports 
young women by providing pre- and post-natal health care and assistance with infant and child care in the early 
years of life. In addition, in coordination with public universities and private agencies, it encourages the reintegration 
of girls into the education system through open education mechanisms and technical training; in 2001, a plan was 
implemented which offers training in non-traditional, competitive technical areas. 
The Operational Unit for Education and Training (UNOPEC) of the Centre for Reproductive Medicine and 
Holistic Development for Adolescents (CEMERA) of the University of Chile is a pilot experiment designed to enable 
pregnant teenagers to remain in school, to prevent abortion and to avoid the abandonment of children and child 
abuse. It targets pregnant adolescents or adolescent mothers and even adolescent fathers from middle- and low-
income strata. Financed with contributions from the State and from the students, subject to individual capacity, it 
offers participants a flexible, non-discriminatory, equitable and comprehensive system for assistance to enable them 
to continue their elementary and secondary schooling and acquire work training, without interrupting the work of 
child-rearing (UNOPEC has a daycare and kindergarten); participatory-type study plans are functional for adolescent 
students. In 1995, the system enabled 72% of a total of 185 participants to complete their studies. 
The Peruvian Institute for Responsible Parenting (INPPARES) is a private, non-profit-making institution, 
one of whose missions is to promote the development and valuation of the role of young men and women in society 
by having them participate in the design and implementation of programmes that concern them directly. The 
Institute’s work with adolescents under the programmes for different beneficiary populations is centred on 
education; courses are offered on sexual and reproductive health and workshops conducted for improving 
relationships between parents and children, since this factor often has a bearing on the occurrence of pregnancy. 
INPPARES also runs a shelter for adolescent mothers, where they are trained in the production of food and textiles. 
The participants put their new knowledge into practice to feed themselves by rearing small animals and growing 
organic vegetables. 
In Ecuador, the Fundación Nuestros Jóvenes, a private, non-profit-making institution, has been carrying out 
a variety of projects, one of which is devoted to the comprehensive care of pregnant adolescent migrants. Its 
objective is to ensure proper living conditions for them and their children, including optimum development 
throughout pregnancy, birth and early childhood. The girls spend six months in one of the Foundation’s shelters and 
receive health care as well as guidance and help from a psycho-educational specialist to support them in raising their 
children and to help them to integrate socially. 
 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Building equity from the beginning: 
the children and adoles cents of Ibero -America  (LC/G.2144), Santiago, Chile, 2001; Ministry for the Status of 
Women/National Women’s Institute (INAMU), Report of Costa Rica. Thirty-third meeting of the Presiding 
Officers of the Regional Conference on Women in Latin America and t he Caribbean (Trinidad and Tobago, 






Insurance is the best-known form of protection against any type of risk (Sojo, 1999); it combines 
anticipation and preparation with palliative-type measures. Since it is so widespread in modern societies, it 
should be considered as a specific policy option for strengthening the response capacity and for active 
adaptation to new risk scenarios. Its main distinctive feature is the use of formal (public and private) 
arrangements for accumulating resources —through various mechanisms (taxes, pricing, quotas, private 
disbursements)— in order to cover damage or exigencies that may result from an eventuality whose 
probability can be estimated. The long-term horizon which is a feature of social security systems, the 
size of the destination population and the element of redistribution (between social groups, generations or 
productive sectors) are features that distinguish these systems from private insurance and safety nets 
(EC-ESA, 2001; Hicks and Wodon, 2001; IDB, 2000a), which normally act as a cushion against economic 
shocks. 
 
Insurance is probably the most obvious policy response to various socio-demographic risks. 
Perhaps the most typical case is ageing, in respect of which social security provides —irrespective of its 
various administration schemes and different pension schemes— a powerful institutional response. 
Notwithstanding their main advantages, any form of insurance has limitations that prevent it being 
considered as an exclusive policy option for risk management. Among these limitations are requirements 
for calculating probabilities that a particular risk will materialize (Guseva and Rona-Tas, 2001) and the 
levels that must be achieved to counteract fully the effects of certain risks’ actually occurring; this places 
insurance in a subordinate position to prevention and training or development of actors’ endogenous 
abilities (Esping-Andersen, 2000). In addition, with the exception of ageing and mortality (and, under 
certain contractual circumstances, divorce), most sociodemographic risks lack markets or the appropriate 
institutionality for insurance; if these risks do materialize, they should be handled on an ad hoc basis 
through individual initiatives or with support from private, family, community or public sources. 
Sociodemographic risks, like many other economic and social risks (Schiller, 1998), but unlike 
unemployment, accidents and theft, have characteristics that do not fit readily into public or private 
insurance plans.19 
 
Credit is another policy option for addressing sociodemographic vulnerability and it can be used not 
only for palliative, but also for preventive, purposes. For example, some of the hardships involved in 
international migration, in particular those relating to economic integration in the destination society, could 
be avoided if the persons had access to public, private or other (international, cooperative or community) 
loans. In general, credit is an effective palliative against a significant increase in expenses, a decline in 
regular income flows or a decline in financial capital. Although for such purposes, any loan option may be 
considered valid, in countries with highly developed loan markets, there are arrangements, normally of a 
private nature, that cover sociodemographic risks (such as the birth of a son, the death of a breadwinner or 
an intra-metropolitan move). While credit provides temporary relief if financial difficulties arise, its action 
is limited to the monetary level. However, just as or more important than this is the fact that many 
sociodemographic risks imply financial blows that rule out the recovery of income flows, which increases 
the uncertainty as to the ability to repay the loan and highlights a bias that is characteristic of private loan 
systems: the fact that they discriminate against those who are least solvent. 
                                                 
19 Indeed, the potential adversities are difficult to express in monetary terms and there is ambiguity between 
damage and potential opportunity. 




5. Promoting organization and group action 
 
There are two approaches for dealing with sociodemographic risks and the eventual adversities that may 
materialize: through the natural or acquired capacities of individual actors (communities, households or 
persons) and through institutional initiatives (by the State, the market or non-governmental organizations). 
Nevertheless, an important part of the response capacity of the units of reference is based on behaviour 
patterns, an area in which organization and group action (that of the family, neighbourhood, community, 
trade union or other) play a leading role. 
 
Family networks are the basic social units for dealing with the challenges involved in raising 
children, especially in the case of large families, adolescent mothers and single -parent households. 
Networks for migrants (whether internal or international) fulfil just as vital a role in terms of welcoming 
and protecting them and even helping them to integrate in their place of destination. Something similar 
occurs with community organization mechanisms which cope with the difficulties that are peculiar to a 
peripheral urban location. Particularly important is the role of group organizations and family networks on 
ageing, especially in terms of care for older persons. 
 
 In addition, units of reference are better able to sensitize the socio-political system and exert 
pressure on decision-makers in order to obtain direct support, formulate and implement policies or 
introduce institutional changes if they form representative organizations and take joint action. Although the 
most outstanding examples of this capacity for response exist outside of the sociodemographic field, group 
claims for public initiatives or institutional change are not unknown in areas such as sexual and 
reproductive health, migration, divorce and living conditions for older adults. 
 
The foregoing suggests clearly that social networking is a powerful instrument for addressing 
sociodemographic vulnerability. The principal policy orientation of public or private agencies and non-
governmental organizations should be to maximize this potential. However, one should bear in mind that 
the existence of a group organization, however strong it may be, is no guarantee of a suitable response to 
the outcome of a risk and, therefore, is not a substitute for action by public -sector institutions. In addition, 
and even when there is a wide range of instruments for promoting this type of organization, the result of its 
application is uncertain and, in many cases, comes up against structural forces that limit its development. 
Lastly, the official promotion for participation and popular action has a downside in that it can be used to 
control social actors through manipulation, co-optation or patronage tactics. 
 
 
E. MEASURES FOR ACTIVE ADAPTATION 
 
 
Adaptation is ultimately another form of response, although it is different from simply strengthening 
response capacity, because it involves a long-term effort and multidimensional and endogenous changes on 
the part of communities, households and individuals in order to deal with the materialization of risk. 
Adaptation is a fully valid strategy in response to risks that are inevitable, part and parcel of modernity or 
combined with opportunities whose merits outweigh their potential adversities. Given the evidence and the 
inexorable nature of emerging sociodemographic risks, adaptive processes are undeniably important. 
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Adaptation is not a suitable  means to deal with risks that are part of economic and sociocultural lag, 
however, mainly because this could cause more harm than good in the long term. It is therefore important 
to distinguish between active adaptation and mere resignation, fatalism or passive acceptance of 
adversities and risks. Passive acceptance, in particular, is a spurious response which must not be 
encouraged.20 
 
Some adaptation alternatives can be used to generate virtuous circles by taking advantage of the 
opportunities inherent in many sociodemographic risks.  A hypothetical example is that of communities 
with a rapid rate of population growth which also achieve high rates of economic growth and job creation. 
In practice, however, productive trends are less governable than demographic ones, which means that this 
ideal adaptation scenario carries no guarantee of long-term sustainability, as it will always be exposed to 
unpredictable economic fluctuations. Another, less hypothetical, scenario is adaptation to take advantage 
of the possible opportunities inherent in international migration, as occurs in the cross-border area of the 
European Union, where the free mobility of productive resources is extended to natural persons. However, 
this scenario is a historic and very particular situation. It is the fruit of a deliberate effort to reduce 
economic, sociopolitical and even cultural differences among countries and the development of a widely 
respected transnational institutional structure. While such differences remain and while the appropriate 
institutional structure is lacking, transnational forums will be unable to act upon the adversities or potential 
of migration in any significant manner. 
 
In some cases adaptation does not target the risk itself, but its negative effects. Residential 
segregation by socioeconomic level is an example of this: although segregation could be mitigated via a 
number of policy alternatives, active adaptation could also mean measures dealing with the negative 
effects on the community as a whole or on segregated households and individuals (see box V.9). This is a 
valid alternative providing that the economic and social costs involved are much lower than those that 
would be incurred by attempting to revert a situation which is already consolidated, or where day-to-day 
coexistence, group solidarity and community identity will be facilitated by neutralizing the adversities 
inherent in the spatial differentiation of socioeconomic groups. Such adaptive and/or compensatory 
mechanisms include: broadening of forums in which the different socioeconomic groups can interact; the 
development of a good, socially heterogeneous public school system; promotion of a culture that values 
social and cultural diversity; and the specification of clear, strict procedures for the redistribution of 











                                                 
20 Many adaptive mechanisms have harmful long-term effects for the reference units. Examples are child 
labour, the confinement of women to the home, the use of areas on the outskirts of cities exposed to environmental 
catastrophes and the transfer of child-rearing responsibilities to grandparents. 










































REDUCING SOCIO-ECONOMIC SEGREGATION: PROPOSALS IN MEXICO CITY  
AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE NETHERLANDS 
 
1. Mexico City. At least three general policy approaches have been put forward with respect to 
sociospatial segregation in the metropolitan area of Mexico City. 
 
(i) improvement of infrastructure and social services in the working-class neighbourhoods that 
are either growing up or in the process of consolidation, in order to reduce disparities in 
facilities between areas inhabited by groups of different income levels; 
(ii) consolidation of housing in working-class neighbourhoods and in towns engulfed by the 
process of conurbation (because of the poor state of many buildings, neighbourhoods that are 
“in formation” are priority areas of action). 
(iii) conservation and creation of socially heterogeneous types of settlement, especially in the 
working-class neighbourhoods of the city centre (in particular, policies geared towards the 
redensification of the oldest urban areas would help to stem the exodus from these working-
class areas). 
The policy tools for this last proposal are contained in a programme to renew working-class housing 
stock, which was put in place after the earthquakes of 1985. In this programme, an exceptional measure —the 
large-scale expropriation of property, together with subsidization of the cost of land for the beneficiaries of the 
programme— was the key to keeping central areas residential. 
 
2.  Netherlands : The level of urban residential segregation in the Netherlands is low, and to prevent it from 
increasing, the Administration has developed a set of policy tools in the areas of urban housing, 
planning and renovation.  
 
(a)  The Netherlands housing policies are built on three strongly anti-segregationist pillars: 
(i) housing corporations, which are private, sometimes profit-making, agencies that date from the 
nineteenth century. They build the bulk of public housing, for which they receive government 
financing and are subject to state oversight. Their housing is geared towards vulnerable 
groups and, beyond the operation of genuine market factors, they are not allowed to 
discriminate among the demand; 
(ii) subsidies to offset low income are calculated using an equation that includes a maximum cost 
per dwelling and a threshold amortization payment (low-cost dwellings are of good quality and 
the private supply of housing for higher-income groups is regulated); 
(iii) a municipal housing allowance in the framework of policies agreed between the State and the 
municipalities, which effectively places a ceiling on prices for rents and sales (in general the 
municipalities oversee the real-estate market). 
(b) Urban planning. A number of provisions and incentives are employed to concentrate urban growth in 
areas close to the main cities, and thus avoid disorderly and segregational suburban development such as has 
occurred in the United States. Likewise, efforts are made to associate construction sites to workplaces, with 
public housing quotas established in pieces of land earmarked for new housing. 
(c) Urban renovation. This consists of demolishing old post-war housing units in poor repair to make way 
for new housing and avoid non-planned suburban development. 
 
Source: Teule, 2001, available at: http://www.lincolninst.edu; CONAPO, 1998. 
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Active adaptation is a suitable approach to the risk of population ageing because, unquestionably, 
communities, households and individuals must learn, in the long term, to live with older adults within a 
“society of all ages” (Guzmán, 2001; ECLAC, 2000g and CELADE, 1997). Some adaptation policy 
options are combined with capacity-strengthening responses, such as insurance, but others are geared 
towards acknowledgement of old age as a natural state of affairs and older people as important actors, 
which means working from a strategic perspective at the levels of knowledge, associativity, perceptions 
and social policies, culture and legislation (see box V.10). In institutional and legal terms, the constitutions 
of a number of the region’s countries make explicit reference to older adults, but this tends to be from a 
traditional, welfare-orientated point of view —the obligation of children to respect and assist their parents, 
or the right of older adults to receive special protection from the State (www.elportaljuridico.com.mx; 
HPP/OPS/OMS, 1999)— which is indicative of an essentially reactive and non-adaptive vision of ageing. 
An exception to this is the constitution enacted in Brazil in 1988, which emphasizes community 
participation and appreciation of older people as matters that should be guaranteed by the family, society 
and the State.21 Although formal recognition in legislation is not always matched in practice, the provisions 
and limits of the institutional structure must be consistent with the panorama of social risks. Thus, to lay all 
the responsibility for the care of the elderly at the door of their children is inopportune and dilutes individual 
and public responsibility. The welfare bias, in turn, though inevitable to some extent, helps to perpetuate an 
image of the older adult that is defined in terms of weaknesses and limitations. 
 
With respect to the risks associated with the second demographic transition, which have a strong 
institutional component —particularly those relating to consensual unions and to divorce— legal and 
normative aspects are crucial to adaptation. For example, many of the adversities of consensual unions 
derive from their lack of recognition under the law. Something similar occurs in the case of divorce, 
because the legislation that regulates it can sharpen its adversities or distribute them in an unfair manner 
between the parties. These risks therefore require firm institutional measures. The reasoning used with 
respect to ageing would dictate that it is time to update legislation and standards to adapt to the emerging 
scenario, which is marked by an increase in the number of consensual unions and divorces. For example, 
the institutional recognition of consensual unions must be broadened, in order to avoid discrimination 
against children born outside marriage (Arriagada, 2001, pp. 39-40). Likewise, the central pillar of 
legislation on divorce must encompass the empowerment of women and children and psychosocial support 
following separation. In these examples, the priority is not to eradicate the risk, but to avoid the adverse 
consequences it may bring. A latent tension therefore exists between action aimed at prevention and 
measures geared towards adaptation, not only in terms of logic, but in practice too, in that adaptive 
measures may encourage the assumption of risk, which openly clashes with preventive efforts. The 
challenge is therefore to design policies and laws that acknowledge the sovereign rights of couples with 
regard to divorce and consensuality and the existence of objective “modernizing” forces that drive such 
decisions (which in many cases may even be the only option) without actually encouraging them. In short, 
this is a complex domain which does not admit categorical statements or unanimous conclusions; as with 
so many other types of risk, however, the worst policy is to ignore them or expect them to solve 
themselves without intervention. 
                                                 
21 Article 230 of the Constitution of Brazil states that the family, society and the State have a duty to care for 
the elderly, ensure that they participate in the community, uphold their dignity and protect their wellbeing, and 
guarantee them the right to life. In addition, programmes of care for the elderly are to be implemented as far as 







































The institutional and legal slant of the foregoing arguments is a necessary part both of technical 
considerations with regard to future trends and of the conceptual importance of rights as regards measures 
taken in response to sociodemographic vulnerability. This is consistent with the thesis that population and 
development policies should be founded on the rights of the individual, as reaffirmed in the Programme of 
Action adopted by the International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo in 1994 
(United Nations, 1995). Indeed, the institutional structure has been adapting to emerging rights and risks in 
relation to a number of population and development issues. But rather than simply identifying risks and 
defining policies to deal with them, the rights-based approach should enshrine a more analytical vision that 
targets the objective effects or average consequences of demographic trends. Any institutional change 
from a rights-based point of view must therefore go beyond the formal aspects and the discourse to deal 
Box V.10 
ADAPTING TO AGEING: SOME BASIC LINES OF ACTION 
 
1. Research and studies 
- Analytical research, case studies and other types of study in order to learn about, analyse and 
interpret the problem of the older adult population. 
 - Systematization of experiences on ageing in other parts of the world. 
- Promotion of technical and professional specialization in areas related to older adults (medical and 
social gerontology, care of the elderly, etc.). 
 
2. Organization of older adults 
- Support for organizations and networks of older adults (at local, provincial, national and 
international levels). 
- Promotion of associativity among older adults. 
 
3. Design of public policies 
- Positive discrimination for older adults. 
- Positioning of older adult affairs as cross-cutting public policy issues. 
 
4.  Empowerment of older adults 
- Socialization and dissemination of coverage, access to and ways to use the existing services. 
- Training that takes into account the recovery of skills and requalification of labour. 
 
5.  Cultural revaluation of the older adult 
- Public awareness-raising with respect to old age and ageing, and older adults as players in 
development. 
- Promotion of change in older adults’ self-perceptions and dissemination of their rights. 
- Promotion of values that encourage positive self-esteem among older adults. 
- Encouragement of a culture of respect for older adults. 
 
 
Source: A. Viveros, Envejecimiento y vejez en América Latina y el Caribe: políticas publicas y las acciones 
de la sociedad, Populación y desarrollo series, No. 22 (LC/L.1657-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2001. United Nations publication, Sales 
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with the issues in practice. For example, a recent study conducted in Central America on responsible 
parenthood issues —one of the backdrops to many sociodemographic risks— stated that: 
 
“The States of the region have made progress in the enactment of laws that directly regulate 
the responsibilities and obligations of fathers and mothers with respect to their sons and 
daughters. Many legal instruments have assimilated the recommendations of international 
forums that seek to build greater equity between men and women and ensure observance of 
the rights of the child and of adolescents. States have also been making commitments to 
protect and regulate the relationship between men and their sons and daughters. The need 
remains, however, to fill the gaps, do away with contradictions and create legal procedures 
to put the legislation into effect” (Alatorre, 2001, p. 48). 
 
The conclusions of the same study affirm that: 
 
“Individuals are often prevented from enforcing their rights by economic or sociocultural 
barriers. It is therefore necessary to educate the community in order to get institutions to 
broaden the law and respect the rights of the members of that community. Moreover, 
broadening the law should start with the recognition of gender inequities, since complicity 
within the legal, household, labour and community spheres enables men to avoid complying 
with their legal obligations and places women at a disadvantage in enforcing their own 
rights and the rights of minors” (Alatorre, 2001, p. 60). 
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